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Introduction

B

y THE NARROWEST OF VOTES (a 7 to 7 split on perhaps its most

controversial conclusion), in fifteen opinions (including six dissents),
totaling 270 pages, following eleven days of hearings during which twenty,five
States testified and more than 30 submitted written materials, l the
International Court ofJustice (ICJ or World Court), on 8 July 1996, provided
the United Nations General Assembly with a nonbinding advisory opinion2 on
the lawfulness of using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons. In the process,
it solemnly affirmed the obvious, obfuscated the serious, and on at least one
important issue that was not even raised by the General Assembly's request
almost certainly reached the wrong conclusion with decisive unanimity. In the
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process, it may have inadvertently and gratuitously undermined the prospects
for international peace and world order on the eve of the new millennium.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the opinion was quickly "interpreted" for the
media by the "spin-doctors" representing such groups as the original
"ban-the-bomb" Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND),3 Greenpeace,4
and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms,s as a
decisive victory for opponents of nuclear weapons-ignoring the fact that their
most vociferous defenders on the Court had issued strong dissenting opinions,
while at the same time the opinion was generally welcomed by prominent U.S.
Government lawyers6 as about as harmless a decision as anyone could have
anticipated under the circumstances, especially given the opinion's political
genesis.?
Particularly revealing were the reactions of the Japanese mayors of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who had made impassioned appeals to the Court to
declare nuclear weapons illegal. Hiroshima Mayor Takashi Hiraoka told
reporters that "the outcome looks as if to approve of the status quo," and
suggested that "the court is controlled by nuclear powers."s Nagasaki Mayor
Itcho Ito expressed his "anger" at the World Court's opinion, declaring to the
press: "I l'IeIt enraged,,9
....
In reality, despite some serious shortcomings, once properly understood, the
core of the advisory opinion was consistent with well-established principles of
international law and is largely to be welcomed. Nevertheless, because it will
certainly continue to be cited in national and international policy debates in
the coming years-and some generally reputable authorities have already
clearly been mislediO-it is important to understand what the Court did and
did not say, and to identify a few clear shortcomings in the opinion.
There were initially two separate requests before the World Court for an
advisory opinion on this issue, but the one brought by the World Health
Organization was turned down by the Court because it was outside the lawful
scope of the WHO's responsibilities. ll While the United States and several
other countries urged the Court to use its discretion and reject the companion
request from the General Assembly as well, the authority of the Assembly to
seek such an opinion was obvious. 12
The General Assembly had taken the position in nonbinding13 resolutions as
early as 24 November 1961, that "the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear
weapons is ... a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nationsj,,14
however, these were typically approved by narrow votes that were hardly
indicative of a broad international consensus. IS Furthermore, even some of the
General Assembly resolutions seemed to recognize that no legal rule had yet
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been established outlawing nuclear weapons per se; for example, an ambiguous
1978 resolution asserted that "the use of nuclear weapons ... should . .. be
prohibited.... "16
Responding to an mltlatlve launched by several anti~nuclear
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), on 15 December 1994, the UN
General Assembly approved Resolution 49/75 K, which provided in part that
the Assembly:
Decides, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United
Nations, to request the International Court of Justice urgently to render its
advisory opinion on the following question: "Is the threat or use of nuclear
weapons in any circumstances permitted under international law?"
The resolution was approved by a vote of 78 to 43, with 38 abstentions.
Thus, only a plurality of those States voting registered support for such an
advisory opinion; or, put differently, a slight majority of the organization did
not approve the request. While the Charter seems to exclude abstentions in
determining the outcome of a votep the Court might certainly have
considered this reality in deciding whether to respond positively to the request.
More significantly, an argument might be made that the resolution itself
required a two-thirds majority to pass pursuant to the second paragraph of
Article 18 of the Charter18-on the theory that urging the World Court to
declare nuclear weapons per se illegal (the clear objective of the resolution)
could have the potential to undermine the entire system of nuclear deterrence
upon which international peace and stability have been premised for fifty years.
Writing about the Court's decision while still a New York University law
professor, the current Deputy Legal Adviser to the United Nations argued that
"it would not have been difficult to hold that a question relating to the threat or
use of nuclear weapons" falls under the two~thirds majority requirement, but
noted that "inexplicably no representative objected" on these grounds.
Nevertheless, he concluded: "It would seem that the Court, in perhaps
unseemly eagerness to address what is evidently one of the most interesting and
important current legal questions, failed to consider the possibly most serious
objection to its jurisdiction to do SO.,,19

Misstating the Question
There is a more fundamental problem with the General Assembly
resolution: It was not phrased in the language of international law, and ind~ed
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seemed calculated to shift the burden of proof from those who argued that
nuclear weapons were unlawful to those who felt otherwise. The underlying
premise of modem international relations is that sovereign States are coequal
and generally independent of constraints except to the degree they consent to
limitations on their freedom of action (normally in exchange for similar
constraints on the conduct of other States), either through treaties and other
international agreements or by a consistent practice that States recognize as
reflecting a legal obligation. The burden thus falls upon those who claim a
breach has occurred to identify the conventional or customary legal rule that
limits the sovereign discretion of the State accused of the breach.
The classic statement of this principle was made by the Permanent Court of
InternationalJustice-the predecessor to the ICJ established under the League
of Nations-in the landmark 1927 case of the S.S. Lotus:
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of
law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed
in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles oflaw and
established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing
independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims.
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed. 20
This principle was reaffirmed by the ICJ as recently as the 1986 Paramilitary
Activities case,zl and the improper wording of the 1994 resolution was objected
to by several States in their written and oral presentations to the Court. 22 The
Court essentially ruled this harmless error,23 while at the same time
acknowledging: "State practice shows that the illegality of the use of certain
weapons as such does not result from an absence of authorization but, on the
contrary, is formulated in terms of prohibitions.,,24
However, it was clear from the declarations and opinions of the individual
judges that accompanied the Court's opinion that the Lotus principle is under
assault by judges from the Third World who wish to see greater constraints
placed upon States without having to obtain their consent. Thus, President
Bedjaoui of Algeria contended in his Declaration that, while the Lotus case had
"expressed the spirit of the times":
It scarcely needs to be said that the fact of contemporary international society is
much altered.... The resolutely positivist, voluntatist approach of international
law which still held sway at the beginning of the century-and to which the
Permanent Court also gave its support in the aforementioned [Lotus]
judgment-has been replaced by an objective conception of international law, a
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law more readily seen as the reflection of a collective juridical conscience and as
a response to the social necessities of States organized as a community.25

Restricting the Right of Self,Defense
The real question before the Court was actually far narrower than might at
first appear from a reading of the General Assembly's Resolution, as it was
universally agreed that possession of nuclear weapons did not confer some sort
of immunity from the prohibition against the aggressive use of force embodied
in the UN Charter.26 Thus, the only real question to be addressed was not
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was ever lawful, but whether
international law prohibited a State in possession of nuclear weapons from
using them, or threatening to use them, under any conceivable circumstances
in a defensive response to armed international aggression. 27
Indeed, since deterrence itself is premised upon an implied "threat" to use
whatever existing weapons may be necessary and otherwise lawful in the event
of aggression, the ICJ was essentially being asked to outlaw the most powerful
instrument in international relations for the dissuasion of aggression and the
promotion of peace. 28 The Court does not appear to have focused on this
reality, although it was at least implicit in the statements of some of the States
who provided comments. 29 One of the most compelling reasons for the Court
to have exercised its discretion3o and not issued the requested opinion-in
addition to the fact that a majority of the General Assembly had not supported
the request, and several States had warned that such an opinion might
undermine diplomatic negotiations-was that the most likely consequence of
even hinting that nuclear weapons were per se unlawful might well be to
undermine the policy of nuclear deterrence that has worked so well for
half,a,century in keeping the world out of World War III. This point will be
addressed infra. 3l

The Proper Legal Standard
The proper role of the International Court of} ustice is not to decide what
result a majority of judges believe to be good public policy or "fair" or
"just,,,32 or to divine legal rules from deep meditation, but to determine
whether the presumptive right of sovereign States to pursue their perceived
interests in a specific manner has been limited by an established rule of
international law. As the Court acknowledged: "It is clear that the Court
cannot legislate.... ,,33
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Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ sets forth the sources of international law
the Court may use in deciding whether c;:onduct has been prohibited:
Article 38

1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes. as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles oflaw recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules oflaw.

Ascertaining the Relevant Law
Thus, the role of the Court was to examine each of these sources of law to
ascertain whether, and if so to what extent, they might limit the threat or use of
nuclear weapons and then to inquire whether there were any conceivable
defensive settings in which the threat or use of a nuclear weapon might not be
in conflict with any such legal rules. The basic inquiry was whether
international law included a per se prohibition against every threat or use of
nuclear weapons and that the proper test was not the "worst case" setting of a
massive aggressive assault involving the delivery of thousands of large nuclear
devices against another State's cities, but rather the "best case"-such as a use
of a nuclear weapon on the High Seas to destroy an enemy warship preparing to
launch weapons of mass destruction against the civilian population of the State
seeking to defend itself.34

International Conventions. Quite correctly, no State contended before the
Court that nuclear weapons were free from constraints under international
law. On the contrary, the nuclear powers readily conceded that any threat or
use of such weapons must comply with the jus ad bellum governing the initiation
of hostilities and the jus in bello regulating the conduct of military
operations-some provisions of which were embodied in treaties and others in
customary law.35
•
For example, it was universally acknowledged that the UN Charter limited
any threat or use of nuclear (or any other) weapons to acts of individual or
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collective self,defense or when authorized by the UN Security Council.36
Similarly, it was accepted without dissent that the laws of armed conflictprohibiting such behavior as attacks on noncombatants, the infliction of
unnecessary suffering, and the use of weapons that are incapable of
discriminating between combatants and noncombatants-are applicable to
nuclear weapons.3?
The Court is to be commended for rejecting a variety of assertions by
opponents of nuclear weapons, such as that Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (guaranteeing the "inherent right to
life") outlawed the defensive use of nuclear weapons in combat (a contrary
holding would presumably have outlawed all lethal weapons).38 It also rejected
claims that a variety of environmental treaties implicitly outlawed nuclear
weapons,39 that various treaties prohibiting "poisonous weapons" applied to
nuclear weapons,40 or that any use of nuclear weapons would constitute
genocideY
The States which denied the existence of a per se prohibition on nuclear
weapons recognized that there were a variety of treaties and international
agreements imposing legal limits on nuclear weapons, ranging from bilateral
arms control agreements negotiated by the United States and the former
Soviet Union to multilateral treaties prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear
weapons in outer space, on the seabed or ocean floor, and in several geographic
"nuclear,free" zones.42
After a lengthy discussion, the Court concluded that while the growing
number of treaties limiting nuclear weapons might be seen as "foreshadowing a
future general prohibition on the use of such weapons, . . . they do not
constitute such a prohibition by themselves."43 In this connection, the Court
noted that under several of these treaties "the nuclear,weapon States have
reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances," and "these
reservations met with no objection from the [other treaty] parties ... or from
the Security Council.,,44

International Custom. As already noted, historically, and as a general principle
today, States are only obligated to abide by legal rules to which they have
individually consented-either by entering into treaties or other international
agreements intended to be binding under international law, or by joining in a
widespread practice with other States out of the belief (opinio juris) that it is an
obligation of international law. The provisions of treaties do not normally
constrain States which have not consented to be so bound, and a State which
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persistently registers its objection to an emerging rule of customary
international law is normally not bound by that rule.
However, there is an exception to the general principle that a State must
consent to be bound by a legal rule. Since the Court's Statute was written, a
consensus has emerged that certain "peremptory norms" of international law
are of such fundamental importance that they will be imposed even upon
persistent objectors despite their lack of consent. Often identified by the Latin
expression jus cogens, these principles have been so universally embraced
through all major legal systems, and the consequences of their breach are
viewed as so objectionable, that the collective world community basically
agreed to impose them on all States. Classic examples include the prohibition
embodied in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibiting the aggressive use of
military force, the prohibition against certain categories of large~scale murder
contained in the Genocide Convention, and the prohibitions against piracy
and the slave trade.
The Court acknowledged the existence of such "intransgressible principles
of international customary law,,45 in the Nuclear Weapons case, but such norms
were not critical to the decision. The standard for constituting a preemptory
norm of international law is considerably higher than that for normal rules of
customary law, and there are no jus cogens rules that are not clearly also
customary law. Once having found that there were no rules of customary law
prohibiting every threat or use of nuclear weapons,46 it was unnecessary for the
Court to ask whether these norms had achieved peremptory status.
To be sure, no country has actually used a nuclear weapon in hostilities since
1945; but the Court rejected assertions that this was evidence of customary law
because of the clear absence of an opinio juris. 47 Another contention that was
rejected was that a series of UN General Assembly resolutions should be
accepted as evidence of a customary rule. While the General Assembly has no
general "lawmaking" authority,48 its resolutions can, when overwhelmingly
supported by member States, serve as evidence of the existence of an opinio
juris. However, as the Court observed, the antinuclear resolutions often
provided that nuclear weapons "should be prohibited," and they were "adopted
with substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions," leading the Court
to conclude: "although those resolutions are a clear sign of deep concern
regarding the problem of nuclear weapons; they still fall short of establishing
the existence of an opinio juris on the illegality of the use of such weapons."49

General Principles of Law, National Judicial Decisions, and Scholarly
Writings. The basic nature of the issue before the Court precluded serious
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recourse to "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the
question of threatening or using nuclear weapons is inherently international in
character. 50 While the Court did note that it was "not called upon to deal with
an internal use of nuclear weapons,,,51 it is obvious that "civilized nations" have
not formulated special "principles of law" governing the domestic use of
nuclear weapons. Similarly, there was little recourse to such "subsidiary means"
for determining legal rules as national judicial opinions and scholarly
treatises. 52

The Dispositif
The Dispositif, or operative provisions, of the Nuclear Weapons case
consisted of six conclusions in paragraph 105 of the opinion, half of which were
little more than what the Court's Vice President (and current President)
acknowledged to be "anodyne asseveration[s] of the obvious .... "53 Thus, no
State has ever contended that there was any "specific authorization of the
threat or use of nuclear weapons" in customary or conventional international
law,54 and including a sentence on this point made little legal sense other than
as a political concession to the framers of the General Assembly Resolution
who had couched their request in such terms.
Similarly, deciding that "a threat or use of force by means of nuclear
weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations
Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful, "55
is obviously tautological-akin to solemnly declaring that "an act prohibited by
international law is unlawful." Again, the inclusion of such an obvious and
unquestioned conclusion presumably can be explained as a concession either
to the supporters of the General Assembly Resolution or to the Court
dissenters who had wished to declare a per se prohibition.
Of an essentially similar nature is the Court's unanimous conclusion that:
A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons should also be compatible
with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict,
particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law,
as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which
expressly deal with nuclear weapons ....56

Again, the nuclear,weapons States had conceded all of these points,57 which
have to this writer's knowledge never been seriously in dispute. Such obvious
conclusions hardly justified the time and money invested in the process by the
General Assembly, the Court, or the member States.
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Turning to more controversial matters, by a still decisive vote of
eleven,to,three, the Court decided:
There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any
comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons
as such....58

This was perhaps the most important part of the decision, both because of the
Court's nearly four,to,one majority on the issue and because it answered the
basic legal questions implicit in the General Assembly's request.
To be sure, the Assembly had actually asked whether there were any
circumstances in which the threat or use of nuclear weapons was permitted
under international law, but the Court quite properly had rephrased the answer
to be consistent with the reality that international law permits that which is not
prohibited.59 Indeed, had the Court limited its reply to this sentence-perhaps
accompanied by language noting that the lawfulness of any use of a nuclear
weapon, like all other weapons not prohibited per se by international law, must
be determined in the context of both why and how they are threatened or
used-it would have been an excellent opinion.
Perhaps the most controversial of the Court's conclusions reads:
It follows from the above,mentioned requirements [of the international law of
armed conflict] that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in
particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of
fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or
use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance
of self,defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake....60

Perhaps the first observation that should be made about this part of the
Court's Dispositif is that it was not initially reached by the majority vote normally
required by the Court's Statute. 61 Judge Andres Aguilar Mawdsley, of Venezuela,
died in October 1995, a month before the case was argued-leaving a Court of
only fourteen members, who divided evenly, seven,to,seven, on this conclusion.
Since in contentious cases it is highly undesirable for tribunals to be unable to
reach a decision, the Court's Statute provides:
In the event of an equality of votes, the President or the judge who acts in his
place shall have a casting vote. 62
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Because of the application of this rule, President Bedjaoui of Algeria-who
in his separate Declaration characterized nuclear weapons as "the ultimate
evil,,63-was permitted to cast a second vote, bringing the official count on this
provision to eight,to,seven. One might note that this outcome was totally a
coincidence of timing, for had the vote occurred less than a year later, after the
distinguished American jurist Steven Schwebel was elected President of the
Court, a different opinion would presumably have resulted.
As an aside, one might argue that the Court has the discretion to withhold
the "casting vote" procedure in advisory opinions. The considerations which
encourage the definitive resolution of contentious disputes between or among
States are not so clearly applicable in the case of a request for an advisory
opinion. The Statute gives the Court discretion to decide which of its
procedural rules are "applicable" to an advisory opinion,64 and it would have
been consistent with the Statute65 and fully responsive to the General Assembly
to reply that:
(1) International law does not prohibit the threat or use of nuclear weapons per
sej
(2) Like all weapons, the threat or use of nuclear weapons must comply with
existingjtls ad bellum andjus in bello,
(3) Based upon the Court's understanding66 of the nature of such weapons, their
use would only be lawful in an exceptional settingj and
(4) In the absence of more detailed information about the characteristics of the
weapon in question, its intended target, the purpose for which the threat or use
of nuclear weapons is made, and many other circumstances, the Court is unable
to provide more specific meaningful advice that would be applicable to every
situation.

In any event, the weight to be accorded the Court's nonbinding "advice" to the
General Assembly on this point ought to be evaluated in the context of the
evenly split vote that produced it; and the "casting vote" procedure should be
'
recognized as the jurisprudential equivalent of a coin toss.
However, having said that, one might also note that, under the
circumstances, the basic conclusion is not all that remarkable. Essentially, the
Court is saying that by the narrowest of possible margins it has decided that it
cannot decide whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful,
even "in an extreme circumstance"; and, given the horrific consequences
commonly associated with any use of nuclear weapons, such a cautious
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conclusion is not all that surprising-particularly in the absence of a concrete
case or detailed information about the characteristics of modem (or future
generations of) nuclear weapons.
Indeed, had the Court merely reported that it "cannot conclude definitively
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an
extreme circumstance of self,defence," omitting the further qualifying
language "in which the very survival of a State would be at stake," this writer
would probably have found that reasonable and acceptable. Given the stakes
involved, speculative conclusions in the absence of necessary facts probably
serve little purpose.
One certainly can embrace the Court's recognition that international
humanitarian law would preclude the use of nuclear weapons in other than
"extreme circumstances," but to conclude further than such circumstances
would necessarily have to involve "a threat to the survival of a State" is
unwarranted by any established or identified legal rule. As shall presently be
demonstrated, there are easily conceivable settings in which a State might have
no effective alternative to using a nuclear weapon to neutralize a threat to the
lives of millions of its civilians, even though the State might nevertheless
continue to exist if it elected to endure such a sacrifice. And if there is any
principle of international humanitarian law that precludes even a threat to use
nuclear weapons as a means of deterring illegal international aggression
involving the use of unlawful weapons of mass destruction, the Court has failed
to identify it. Indeed, any rule that would prohibit a State in lawful possession
of nuclear weapons from even threatening to use them defensively to preserve
the lives of tens of millions of innocent noncombatants would stand as clear
evidence that law had become part of the problem-or, in the words of
Dickens: "If the law supposes that, the law is a ass, a idiot.,,67

Dangerous Ambiguity: The World Court and the Use of Nuclear
Weapons in Defense of Third States
The Court does not in the Dispositif clarify whether a distinction exists
between threatening or using nuclear weapons in response to "extreme
circumstances of self,defense" threatening the survival of the nuclear,weapons
State itself, and a threat by such a State to use nuclear weapons in collective
defense against a threat to the survival of a third State; however, elsewhere in
the opinion there is a reference to a State using nuclear weapons "in an
extreme circumstance of self,defence, in which its very survival would be at
stake.,,68 This is an alarming statement, and it is contrary to the spirit of the
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United Nations Charter, which expressly recognizes "the inherent right of
individual or collective self~defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations."69 Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who chaired the
subcommittee of Commission III at San Francisco that actually drafted Article
51, explained to his Senate colleagues in 1949:
To make a long story short, Latin-America rebelled-and so did we. If the
omission [of the right of collective self-defense] had not been rectified there
would have been no Charter. It was rectified, finally, after infinite travail, by
agreement upon article 51 of the Charter. Nothing in the Charter is of greater
immediate importance and nothing in the Charter is of equal potential
importance. 7o

Similarly, in explaining this proVisIon to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in July 1945, John Foster Dulles affirmed:
At San Francisco, one of the things which we stood for most stoutly, and which
we achieved with the greatest difficulty, was a recognition of the fact that that
doctrine of self-defense, enlarged at Chapultepec to be a doctrine of collective
self-defense, could stand unimpaired and could function without the approval of
the Security Council.71

There is a strong argument that the right of sovereign States to use necessary
and proportional lethal force in defense against armed international aggression
is not only "inherent," as the English~language text of Article 51 terms it, but
also "imprescriptable" (as the Russian text of Article 51 asserts 72) or
"inalienable" (as the United States argued in 192873). In his separate opinion,
Judge Fleischhauer (Germany) argued that the Court could also have found
legal support for this right in "the general principles of law recognized in all
legal systems," as it is universally recognized "that no legal system is entitled to
demand the self-abandonment, the suicide, of one of its subjects."74 This view
was also embraced by President Bedjaoui, who acknowledged that «[a] State's
right to survival is ... a fundamental law, similar in many respects to a 'natural'
law.,,75 It is certainly not a right to be narrowed by judicial fiat of the World
Court, and anyone asserting that a victim of aggression may not defend itselfby
the use oflawful weapons, against lawful targets, in compliance with the law of
armed conflict--or may not obtain voluntary assistance from other
peaceloving States in meeting the aggression collectively-has the burden of
identifying the legal basis for such a rule in conventional or customary
international law. The principle of acting collectively to meet threats to the
peace is not only unimpaired by the Charter, it is the very first objective
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embodied in the Charter76 ; and simple declarations, unsupported by
compelling legal authority, asserting or implying such limitations, are
insufficient--even when they emanate from the World Court. As the Court
has acknowledged, it "cannot legislate,,,77 yet a careful reading of their opinions
suggests that "legislate" is exactly what some of the judges attempted to do. 78
Few legal doctrines have been more critical in deterring aggression and
promoting peace than the recognized right of relatively weak victims of
aggression to call upon other peaceloving members of the world community for
assistance in the event they are victims of armed international aggression; and
why the World Court seems determined to undermine this important Charter
principle is unclear. 79 In essence, the World Court seems to be announcing that
States that can acquire weapons of mass destruction and do not respect the rule
of law will be free to use them at will against weaker peaceloving States that
lack such weapons-because the nuclear,weapons States will be prohibited by
international law from responding (or even threatening to respond) in kind to
even the most flagrant criminal acts of aggression. 8o This point is of more than
academic importance, because one of the incentives in the Nuclear
Non,Proliferation Treaty (NPT)81 to encourage States to forego their right to
develop nuclear weapons was a promise, endorsed by the Security Council, that
the nuclear,weapon States would come to their defense in the event they were
threatened with nuclear weapons.82 As Judge Oda Oapan) said in the
conclusion of his dissenting opinion in the case:
One can conclude from the above that, on the one hand, the NPT regime which
presupposes the possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear,weapon States
has been firmly established and that, on the other, they have themselves given
security assurances to the non,nuclear weapon States by certain statements they
have made in the Security Council. ... It is generally accepted that this NPT
regime is a necessary evil in the context of international security, where the
doctrine of nuclear deterrence continues to be meaningful and valid.B3

Pactum de Contrahendo or Pactum de Negotiando?
The final paragraph of the Dispositif was also reached by unanimous
decision:
There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and
effective international control.84
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This part of the opinion may warrant more consideration than it has thus far
received. While the General Assembly's request for an advisory opinion was
clearly politically motivated and poorly phrased, the question focused entirely
upon the existing legal status of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and did
not even suggest that advice was being sought on obligations to negotiate new
limitations.85 Nevertheless, the Court sua sponte elected to address this
issue-presumably as another consolation to States that had hoped or
expected a decision that nuclear weapons are unlawful per se.
Not surprisingly, this dicta did not escape the attention of the General
Assembly, which in December 1996 approved a resolution thanking the Court,
"taking note" of the opinion, and then resolving that the General Assembly:

3. Underlines the unanimous conclusion of the Court that there exists an obligation
to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control;

4. Calls upon all States to fulfill that obligation immediately by commencing
multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a
nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing,
deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and
providing for their elimination.86

Because dicta from the ICJ advisory opinion is being used to argue that a legal
duty now exists to reach agreement on these issues, it is important to look more
carefully at this part of the Court's opinion and at the legal theories upon which
it is premised.
By way of background, paragraph F of the Dispositif was premised upon
Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which provides:
Article VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international contro1.87

In paragraphs 99 and 100 of its advisory opinion, the Court quotes this
provision and then provides this conclusion:
The legal importance of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of
conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise
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result-nuclear disarmament in all its aspects-by adopting a particular course
of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith ....
This twofold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations formally concerns
the 182 States parties to the Treaty ... or, in other words, the vast majority of the
international community.88
Despite the unanimous vote on paragraph F of the Dispositif, the Court
seems clearly to have confused two related legal concepts: an agreement to
conclude a specific agreement in the future (pactum de contrahendo) and an
agreement to negotiate in good faith in the future in an effort to reach
agreement on a specified issue (pactum de negotiando). In this case, the Court's
conclusion is simply not reconcilable with the text or travaux. of the agreement.
It is submitted that Article VI of the NPT does not, and cannot reasonably be
interpreted to,89 obligate treaty parties to conclude anything-the obligation is
clearly only to "pursue negotiations in good faith" towards that end.
The basic principles for interpreting international agreements are set forth
in the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties,9o which, while not binding
as conventional law on all parties to the NPT, are widely recognized as
reflecting customary international law. Under the heading "General rule of
interpretation," the Convention provides, inter alia:
Article 31
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.

The "ordinary meaning" of a promise to "pursue negotiations" is not "to
reach an agreement"-which, if it has any meaning, presumably would require
States to accept the best terms the other side was willing to offer.91 To be sure,
the same obligation would exist for the second State-or in this instance for all
of the 185 parties to the treaty. Does this mean that the first State to get to the
World Court can obtain a judgment requiring all of the other treaty parties to
"conclude" the treaty favored by the petitioning State? Since the so,called
"obligation to ... conclude negotiations" is not simply for a disarmament
treaty, but one incorporating "strict and effective international control," is it
the proper role of the Court to consider the first proposal brought before it, and
if in the Court's wisdom that proposal includes such control, to compel every
other treaty party to adhere to those terms? Or does the Court instead intend
to assume the legislative task of drafting perhaps hundreds of pages of highly
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detailed and intrusive inspection and verification terms, to be imposed upon
sovereign States irrespective of their consent?
What, pray tell, is the Court then to do with the States that are not parties to
the NPT and thus have clearly not consented to this alleged "obligation ... to
conclude negotiations?" Having declared that all treaty parties must enter into
"a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control," what is the Court then to do about the small number of
non,parties to the treaty who do not elect either to surrender all of their
weapons or to submit to the controls the Court seeks to impose upon treaty
parties? Are they to be rewarded by being allowed to remain outside the
disarmament regime-presumably expanding their arsenals (at "going, out,
of,business" discount prices) as their neighbors are compelled by the Court to
rid their territory of all weapons-or will the Court anoint the first
"acceptable" draft treaty submitted to it by any treaty party as establishing ajus
cogens obligation erga omnes?
Perhaps the most interesting practical question raised by such an approach is
how long the NPT would continue to exist before one State after another
invoked its right under Article X to withdraw from the treaty-citing the
out,of,control World Court as the "extraordinary event" that has "jeopardized
the supreme interests of its country?"n Surely world peace and the rule of law
would not be furthered by such an obvious misinterpretation of the NPT.
Fortunately, the NPT is safe, because the World Court clearly reached the
wrong conclusion in this nonbinding advisory opinion. The issue raised by
Article VI of the NPT is not one of first impression in international law. Even
, when the language of an agreement clearly provides that the parties will not
just negotiate but conclude a future agreement, unless the terms are essentially
fi..xed by reference to the original agreement, tribunals tend to treat them as
nothing more than a commitment to negotiate in good faith. Thus, in the 1925
Tacna Arica Award (Chile v. Peru)-which involved an agreement to conclude
a future protocol to prescribe "the manner in which the plebiscite is to be
carried out, and the terms and time for the payment by the nation which
remains the owner of the provinces of Tacna and Arica"93-the arbitrator
found:
As the Parties agreed to enter into a special protocol, but did not fix its terms,
their undertaking was in substance to negotiate in good faith to that end.... Neither
Party waived the right to propose conditions which it deemed to be reasonable
and appropriate to the holding of the plebiscite, or to oppose conditions proposed
by the other Party which it deemed inadvisable. The agreement to make a special
protocol with undefined terms did not mean that either Party was bound to make an
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agreement unsatisfactory to itself provided it did not act in bad faith. Further, as the
special protocol was to be made by sovereign States, it must also be deemed to be
implied in the agreement . . . that these States should act respectively in
accordance with their constitutional methods, and bad faith is not to be
predicated upon the refusal of ratification of a particular proposed protocol
deemed by the ratifying authority to be unsatisfactory.94

In 1931, the predecessor to the current World Court-the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCrn-issued an Advisory Opinion on
Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland95 at the request of the League of
Nations. Summarized briefly, in an effort to resolve a quarrel between the two
countries, the Council of the League of Nations had approved a resolution
recommending "the two Governments to enter into direct negotiations as
soon as possible in order to establish such relations between the two
neighbouring States [as] will ensure 'the good understanding between
nations upon which peace depends' .... "96 This resolution was accepted by
both countries, and Poland subsequently contended that Lithuania was
obligated to agree to reopen a section of railway between Vilna and Livau
that had been destroyed dUring World War 1.
The PCI] concluded that both States were legally bound by the "agreement
to negotiate" contained in the Council's resolution, but rejected the Polish
view that this was in reality a legal obligation "not only to negotiate but also to
come to an agreement," explaining:
The Court is indeed justified in considering that the engagement incumbent on
the two Governments in conformity with the Council's Resolution is not only to
enter into negotiations, but also to pursue them as far as possible, with a view to
concluding agreements .... But an obligation to negotiate does not imply an
obligation to reach an agreement....97

In 1950 the newly established International Court ofJ ustice was asked for an
advisory opinion on whether South Africa had a legal duty to negotiate a
trusteeship agreement to place the former German colony of South,West
Africa-which had been placed under South African control by a League of
Nations mandate following World War I-under the new UN trusteeship
system.98 While the Court majority found no such obligation, in his dissent,
Judge Alvarez found not only a duty to negotiate but also an "obligation" to
reach an agreement. However, he acknowledged: "even admitting that there is
no legal obligation to conclude an agreement, there is, at least, a political
"
oblIgatlOn
.... ,,99
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Consider as well a 1972 arbitral award by a tribunal established to resolve
disputes between Greece and Germany resulting from World War II. The
tribunal was asked to decide whether an undertaking to engage in "further
discussions" and "negotiations" included an obligation to reach an actual
agreement. The tribunal held;
\XTith the ratification of the Agreement, the parties ... undertook to negotiate
their dispute anew notwithstanding the earlier refusals of both sides to retreat
from positions that had hardened over the years. Article 19 must be considered
as a pactum de negotiando. The arrangement arrived at between the parties in the
present case is not a pactum de contrahendo as we understand it. This term should
be reserved to those cases in which the parties have already undertaken a legal
obligation to conclude an agreement.... 100

The tribunal went on to note that even a pactum de negotiando creates legal
obligations for the parties:
However, a pactum de negotiando is also not without legal consequences. It means
that both sides would make an effort, in good faith, to bring about a mutually
satisfactory solution by way of a compromise, even if that meant the
relinquishment of strongly held positions earlier taken. It implies a willingness for
the purpose of negotiation to abandon earlier positions and to meet the other
side part way.IOI

An article published in the highly acclaimed Encyclopedia of Public
IntematioT¥l1 Law in 1997 on these two types of agreements concluded that
neither contains an enforceable legal obligation to do more than negotiate in
good faith:
In the author's view there is no relevant distinction between the two pacta in the
legal quality of the obligations resulting from these instruments. There is no case
where an absolute "agreement to agree" has been recognized by an international
tribunal. Therefore, the contractual obligations to negotiate in good faith with a
view to concluding a subsequent agreement, laid down in pactum-be it named
pactum de contrahendo or pactum de negotiando-will only differ slightly according
to the circumstances in the particular case: the margin of negotiation on matters
of substance left open to the parties for shaping the ultimate agreement will be
larger or smaller according to the degree to which the substantive contents of the,
final agreement can be determined by means of the pactum itself.lo2

International and National Treatises. If one were to examine "judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
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nations,,,103 one would find similar conclusions. One of the world's foremost
authorities on treaty law was Lord Arnold Duncan McNair, who during his
distinguished career served as president of both the International Court of
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. He provides this discussion
in his classic 1961 treatise, The Law of Treaties:
Pactum de contrahendo
This term is correctly applied to an agreement by a State to conclude a later
and final agreement, and these preliminary agreements are of frequent
occurrence .... When they are expressed with sufficient precision, they create
valid obligations....
It is, however, necessary to distinguish between a true obligation to enter into a
later treaty and an obligation merely to embark upon negotiations for a later treaty
and to carry them on in good faith and with a genuine desire for their success.
Less happily in our opinion, the term pactum de contrahendo is applied to an
obligation assumed by two or more parties to negotiate in the future with a view to
the conclusion of a treaty. This is a valid obligation upon the parties to negotiate
in good faith, and a refusal to do so amounts to a breach of the obligation. But the
obligation is not the same as an obligation to conclude a treaty or to accede to an
existing or future treaty, and the application to it of the label pactum de
contrahendo can be misleading and should be avoided. 104

Turning to United States law, Professor Allan Farnsworth served as
Reporter to the Second Restatement of Contracts, and his multivolume treatise,
Farnsworth on Contracts, is among the leading texts on the issue in the United
States. He discusses a variety of judicial opinions refusing to enforce
agreements to agree on the grounds that they were "vague and indefinite," and
under the heading "Agreements to Negotiate" writes:
Under an agreement to negotiate, the parties negotiate with the knowledge that
if they fail to reach ultimate agreement they will not be bound. The parties to an
agreement to negotiate do, however, undertake a general obligation of fair
dealings in their negotiations .... [H]ere there is no way of knowing what the
terms of the ultimate agreement would have been, or even whether the parties
would have arrived at an ultimate agreement .... Because of the uncertain scope
of an undertaking to negotiate, a court cannot be expected to order its specific
performance, though it might enjoin a party that had undertaken to negotiate
exclusively from negotiating with others. I05

Professor Farnsworth notes that English courts have been "adamant" on this
issue, quoting "a distinguished English judge" as having "condemned an
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agreement 'to negotiate fair and reasonable contract sums' " by saying: "If the
law does not recognise a contract to enter into a contract (where there is a
fundamental term yet to be agreed) it seems to me it cannot recognise a
contract to negotiate.,,106

The Travaux Preparatoire. If there is any remaining doubt about whether
Article VI of the NPT is an agreement to conclude a future agreement, it is
useful to return to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
Article 32

Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory works of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 107

While it is difficult to contend that the language of Article VI is ambiguous
or obscure--or otherwise meets the test for resorting to supplementary means
of interpretation-it is nevertheless useful to consult the travaux preparatoires
to confirm that the unanimous World Court reached the wrong result. The
standard reference on the NPT is Mohamed I. Shaker's multivolume study,
The Nuclear Non,Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959-1979,
which provides useful background on Article VI.
Dr. Shaker notes that the original drafts included merely preambulatory
references to the importance of ending the nuclear arms race and achieving
disarmament, and notes that "the two super,Powers preferred a simple treaty
without linking it with any other arms control and disarmament measures .... "108
India, however, "advocated that a non,proliferation treaty must embody an
article of solemn obligation under which nuclear,weapon States would negotiate a
meaningful programme of reduction of existing stockpiles of weapons and their
delivery vehicles. . . . The obligation was therefore not merely to negotiate a
meaningful programme but to undertake certain measures.,,109 Similarly, Romania
proposed that "{t)he nuclear weapon States Parties to this Treaty undertake to
adopt specific measures ...."110 However, as Dr. Shaker observes:
[I] t was realised that it would not have been accepted by both the Soviet Union
and the United States. Moreover, it was pointed out that it would have hardly been
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feasible in legal terms to enter into obligations to arrive at agreements. The least [sic]
that could be done, therefore, was to introduce in the NPT an obligation "to
pursue negotiations in good faith" as proposed by Mexico, or "to negotiate" as
proposed by Brazil.... The Mexican formula was the one adopted by the two
co-Chairmen in their identical treaty drafts of 18 January 1968. 111
Lest there be any doubt about the obligation that resulted, Dr. Shaker notes:
Under the pressure of the non-aligned States as well as from some of their own
allies, the two super-Powers merely accepted in the NPT to undertake to pursue
negotiations in good faith, but not, as pointed out by one American negotiator,
"to achieve any disarmament agreement, since it is obviously impossible to predict the
exact nature and results of such negotiations."m
It is thus clear from the text, the travaux, and the underlying legal principles
involved, that Article VI of the NPT constitutes only a pactum de negotiando-an
obligation to negotiate in good faith towards the specified end-and, despite the
unanimous character of the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion on this point to
the contrary, it does not constitute a pactum de contrahendo. Indeed, the very
language of the agreement-with references to "effective measures" and "strict
and effective international control"--explains why this was but an undertaking
"to pursue negotiations in good faith" on the subject.
It might be added that if, despite the clear language to the contrary, this was
a pactum de contrahendo, the terms of this agreement would presumably need to
be objectively ascertainable with reasonable clarity. Unless the Court is
prepared to spell out the precise terms of a "treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control," including
identifying when, where, by whom, and under what conditions the highly
intrusive international verification inspections are to occur-so that it will be
possible to identify which States are in breach for failing to anticipate and
accept those terms-it is difficult to take this portion of the Court's decision
very seriously. It is mere brutum fulmen.
It is evident that the Court cannot flush out even basic terms for any such
agreement, because no such agreement ever existed in the minds of the parties
when they entered into the treaty. Presumably, they all shared a vision that
someday the world might live at peace without war, and some may well have
had in mind specific provisions they intended to try to insert in any convention
promoting this end. But the convention travaux provide no suggestion that
anything approaching final treaty terms was ever discussed as the NPT was
drafted.
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Equally clearly, one can be confident that few countries would have ratified
the NPT with the expectation that the World Court might subsequently
declare them in breach of an obligation to ratify a subsequent treaty containing
highly intrusive but unknowable verification and inspection provisions-not
to mention to surrender all of their arms-and premise their security upon the
Court imposing a verifiable and effective machinery to prevent all possible
violations of this unknown future convention. Put simply, Article VI of the
NPT creates nothing more than an obligation to negotiate in good faith; and
the Court's 1996 advisory opinion cannot change that.

A Legal Use of Nuclear Weapons: The Missing Hypothetical
The World Court is, in the view of the present writer, clearly mistaken in its
conclusion that the only conceivable lawful use of nuclear weapons would
involve a threat to the survival of a State, but the fault may not be entirely that
of the judges. Much of the public debate on this issue has been fueled by
scholarship and government studies, dating from the 1950s and 1960s, on the
destructive nature of nuclear weapons, and the nuclear,weapons States have
understandably surrounded their more recent weapon' development programs
in a shroud of secrecy.
One would have thought, given the importance of the issue and the
widespread reports of the existence of a new generation of low,yield, highly
accurate nuclear weapons, that at least one of the nuclear powers would have
set forth at least one hypothetical that the Court could use in its legal analysis
phase-applying the law to specific facts-but other than a few vague
references to "High Seas," "submarines," and "deserts,,,113 this does not appear
to have been done.
Candidly, even these brief references should have given the Court sufficient
insight to envision some possible uses of nuclear weapons that would not
necessarily conflict with existing laws-a single example would have permitted
a conclusion that under certain conceivable circumstances the threat or use of
nuclear weapons may be lawful. The ICJ Statute provides that in its advisory
functions the Court shall be "guided by the provisions of the present Statute
which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to
be applicable,"114 and those provisions provide a plethora of fact,finding
instruments. Unlike the situation in American courts, where the absence of a
party permits the tribunal to accept the facts as properly pleaded by the other
party, the World Court must before rendering a decision in the absence of a
party "satisfy itself ... that the claim is well founded in fact and law."115 It may
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also call upon parties to a case "to produce any document or to supply any
explanation,,,116 and may "entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission, or
other organization that it may select, with the task of carrying out an inquiry or
giving an expert opinion.,,117
Sadly, instead of asking States who argued that not all potential threats or
uses of nuclear weapons were per se unlawful to provide one or more examples,
the Court essentially bypassed the task of applying the law to the most
favorable conceivable set of facts implicit in the question before it. lIB As Judge
Higgins observed:
It is not sufficient, to answer the question put to it, for the Court merely briefly to
state the requirements of the law of armed conflict (including humanitarian law)
and then simply to move to the conclusion that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons is generally unlawful by reference to the principles and norms .... At no
point in its Opiaion does the Court engage in the task that is surely at the heart of
the question asked: the systematic application of the relevant law to the use or
threat of nuclear weapons. It reaches its conclusions without the benefit of
detailed analysis. An essential step in the judicial process-that of legal
reasoning-has been omitted. 119

This is unfortunate, because there are any of a number of hypotheticals
which the Court could have envisioned (or which the nuclear-weapon States
might have suggested) that might be used to illustrate a lawful use of a nuclear
weapon. A single case should have allowed the Court to inform the General
Assembly that in at least some circumstances the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful-as the Court was neither requested nor expected to
provide a comprehensive legal evaluation of every conceivable circumstance.
Even at this date, it would seem useful to have such a hypothetical.
Consider for a moment the plight of the Russian Navy, whose sailors have
often been required to go months without a paycheck and for whom the new
regime promises little of the glory of earlier decades. Imagine that a group of
Russian officers and their crew decide that action is warranted, and they decide
to sell their Delta IV, Typhoon, or newer Borey,class120 nuclear submarine to a
terrorist group or international criminal cartel for a few million dollars.
Alternatively, imagine they decide themselves to use this powerful weapons
system to compel the world to restore Leninists to power throughout the old
Soviet Empire-demanding in the process that all elected leaders of each
current regime be publicly executed, or else.
To enforce these demands and illustrate the else, the group controlling the
submarine launches three SS-N-18 121 sea,launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)
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from the mid,Atlantic, each with three SaO-kiloton reentry vehicles (each
with more than twenty,five times the destructive power of the device
detonated over Hiroshima in 1945), targeted for air bursts over London, Paris,
and Berlin during afternoon rush hour. Within less than an hour, millions of
casualties are reported in Europe, and the long,term projections are even more
frightening.
Having demonstrated its seriousness, the submarine continues towards the
American coastline, its captain announcing that three of its remaining missiles
will soon be fired at targets in the Washington, D.C., New York and Chicago
areas. It will then move to the Pacific and attack targets in Los Angeles, San
Diego, and Mexico City; and if confirmation has not been received that the
changes in regimes and executions of "traitors" have taken place, similar
attacks will be made in] apan, China, and perhaps other population centers in
Asia. To deter any foolish efforts to destroy the submarine, the captain explains
that all of his missiles will be launched immediately at American cities upon
any detection of another submarine or warship in its vicinity, or if the sound of
a launched torpedo is detected.
Let us suppose further that, with the cooperation of the Russian
Government, the United States has been able to track the movement of the
submarine. The Military Committee at the United Nations convenes, and
upon its advice the Security Council immediately asks the United States to
take effective military action to destroy the submarine before it launches the
missile now reported to be aimed to impact within 500 meters of the UN
Headquarters.
Does international law really require the American representative to the
Security Council to announce:
Mr. President and Members of the Security Council. I have been in contact with
my Government, and I have some good news and some bad news. The good news
is that our Air Force reports that its pilots have the skill to drop a 20-kiloton
nuclear device sufficiently close to the submarine that they are certain it would be
destroyed instantaneously and without any warning, before any additional
missiles could be launched. The bad news is that, pursuant to the legal principles
enunciated by the International Court ofJustice in the 1996 Advisory Opinion
on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, since the United States could clearly
"survive" the attacks which are being threatened-albeit with the projected loss
of 10-20 million of our people-it is unlawful for us to attempt effective measures
to defend ourselves (or the United Nations) in this situation. Indeed, the
weapons that previously would have been available to address such a threat were
removed from our inventory and dismantled some years ago. Let us pray.
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Perhaps the threat instead would come from a Libya, Iran, Sudan, North
Korea, or even Cuba that had purchased a used Soviet diesel submarine and
installed primitive ballistic missiles designed to disperse toxic anthrax or other
biological agents across population centers in various countries. One could
hypothesize numerous such scenarios that would be as credible as any
suggestion in 1989 that a year later Saddam Hussein would invade Kuwait and
threaten to use weapons of mass destruction against UN sanctioned forces
trying to protect Kuwait and its neighbors. One could multiply such examples
several fold as the venue shifted from destroying submarines or other warships
on the High Seas, to striking tanks or super,hardened military command posts
or weapons bunkers in the desert, to assorted other options not involving direct
attacks near population centers.
Indeed, as this writer has suggested elsewhere,122 one of the most effective
means of deterring aggression is to have the capability to attack radical regime
elites who initiate aggressive wars. Possession of a highly,accurate, low,yield,
deep penetrating "bunker,buster" nuclear device might well persuade a future
Saddam Hussein-who had sacrificed hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers
in his war against Iran and was clearly willing to risk massive troop loses in his
1991 resistance to the UN Security Council-that initiating or continuing
massive international aggression might well have hegative consequences of a
highly personal nature. 123
One need not devote pages of analysis to demonstrate that using a nuclear
weapon against a terrorist submarine on the high seas, if necessary to terminate
an ongoing barrage of far more destructive weapons of mass destruction against
innocent civilians, is clearly consistent with jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It
follows as well that the hypothesized attacks would not "threaten the survival
of the State.,,124 Therefore, the Court's extremely narrow exception in
paragraph E of the Dispositif is simply wrong as a matter of international law.
Fortunately, of course, advisory opinions of the World Court have no binding
authority over States. 125

Making the World Safe for World War ill:
Limiting Defense and Undermining Deterrence
For anyone who has witnessed the inhumanity of war firsthand and cares
about the preservation of peace, portions of the Court's advisory opinion are
disquieting. Without in the least disputing the horrendous consequences likely
to be associated with any use of nuclear weapons, one can still wonder whether
the judges have forgotten the frightening realities of conventional warfare?
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Why, one must wonder, are they so eager to outlaw even the threat of a nuclear
response to major acts of armed international aggression-is there some sense
of "fair play" that leads them to wish to assure future Adolph Hitlers and
Saddam Husseins that the consequences of massive aggression will never be
too unacceptable?
The primary reason for the establishment of the United Nations, of which
the International Court ofjustice is the "principal judicial organ,"126 is "to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war.... "127 Yet many of the leaders
of the antinuclear campaign which precipitated the General Assembly's
request for an advisory opinion view the problem not as stopping
aggression-irrespective of the weapons used-but as merely eliminating
nuclear weapons. One scholar, for example, envisions "an unprecedented
opportunity" as the world approaches the new century "to create a world in
which our children will be free from the threat of nuclear war.,,128 One is
tempted to respond: "You mean like in Europe in 1915 and 1943?"
He tells us that "[s]ince 1945, humanity has lived on the edge ofaprecipice,
with human history literally hanging in the balance,,,129 and that "[f]or over
forty years, the world has lived with the relentless and harrowing fear that the
nuclear arms race might eventually result in a nuclear war."130 One need not
quarrel with such conclusions to note, as well, that in no small part because of
the perceived horrendous consequences of such a war, during this same period,
most of the world has also lived in peace.
This same writer expresses understandable alarm at estimates that a
strategic nuclear exchange attacking only "key military targets" could kil110 to
20 million people; 13l but he fails to remind us that two,to,four times that many
people died in the conventional phases of World War II,132 that more than 100
million people have died in major conventional wars in this century,133 and that
advances in conventional military technology in the past half,century strongly
suggest that a non,nuclear World War III could be far more destructive of
human life than were any earlier wars-even if one assumes that, once started,
such a conflict would not ultimately escalate to the use of even illegal weapons
of mass destruction.
The most vociferous critics of nuclear deterrence apparently see no
distinction between the possession of such weapons by liberal democracies
firmly committed to upholding the Charter principles and possession by rogue
States and terrorist groups-ignoring a compelling body of political science
that demonstrates that by far the most important variable in predicting the
outbreak of war is not the existence or absence of any category of weapons, but
the nature of the political systems of the potential parties to the conflict. 134
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Compelling statistical data indicate that democracies do not attack
democracies, and aggression results not from peaceloving States being too well
armed, but far more commonly from a relatively small number of radical regime
leaders concluding that they will benefit from aggression because their
potential adversaries lack either the will or the ability to respond effectively to
aggression. 135 As the American Founding Fathers understood,136 and as the
Latin maxim qui desiderat pacem praeparet bellum137 affirms, it is perceived
weakness, rather than strength, in its potential victims that encourages
aggression.
Indeed, the most impressive contemporary scholarship demonstrates with
remarkable clarity that both World War I and World War II resulted in large
part from perceptions by potential aggressors that their victims, and States
which might come to their aid, lacked both the will and the ability to respond
effectively to aggression. 138 Thus, the eminent Yale University Historian
Donald Kagan notes that, following World War I, "British leaders disarmed
swiftly and thoroughly and refused to rearm in the face of obvious danger until
it was too late to save France and almost too late to save Britain,,,139 and he
observes that the failure of the League of Nations to act to defend Ethiopia
from aggression in 1936 helped persuade Mussolini to join forces with Hitler:
"The democracies seemed weak, indecisive, and cowardly, and their failure and
inaction gave courage to their enemies.,,140
When Hitler moved to remilitarize the Rhineland in violation of the
Versailles Treaty, Professor Kagan notes that "British policy was to avoid war at
all costs,,,141 and that Hitler had actually promised his generals that he would
withdraw his forces at the first sight of French resistance. He quotes Hitler as
later writing: "The forty,eight hours after the march into the Rhineland were
the most nerve,wracking in my life. If the French had then marched into the
Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs, for
the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate for
even a moderate resistance.,,142 Professor Kagan writes:
There is no doubt that some leaders of the German Army were powerfully
opposed to an attack on Czechoslovakia ... [in 1938] because they believed it
would lead to a general war for which Germany was not prepared and which it
was bound to lose. When they confronted Hitler he assured them that Britain
and France would not fight .... Perhaps the most important reason for the failure
of this belated attempt at deterrence was that it lacked credibility. Whatever its
military capabilities, would Britain have the will to use them? Whatever their
commitments, would the British have the courage to honor them? ... Small
wonder that Hitler never seems to have taken his opponents' warnings seriously.
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As he laid plans for the attack' on Poland he discounted the danger from the
leaders of Britain and France. "I saw them at Munich," he said. "They are little
worms. ,,143

World War II did not result from a failure of "arms control" or the presence
of too many weapons. The London and Washington naval agreements helped
weaken the military power of the democracies, and after the war was over,
Japanese leaders explained that watching movie newsclips of American
soldiers in Mississippi training with wooden rifles had helped convince them of
American weakness-and thus strengthened the case for attacking Pearl
Harbor. 144
Properly utilized, international law has a powerful contribution to make to
the cause of international peace and security. But parchment barriers like the
NPT, the Geneva Protocol on chemical and bacteriological warfare,145 and the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) ,146 are not enough to guarantee peace.
The reason Hitler did not use his chemical weapons when the tides of battle
turned against him during World War II was not out of respect for
international law, but because he knew the Allies would retaliate in kind as a
belligerent reprisal. Indeed, if all that were necessary to control aggression were
more solemn, legally, binding, promises, we would need no new treaties-for
any act of aggression will automatically breach the most fundamental principle
of the UN Charter. 147 Why assume that a tyrant who is willing to ignore the UN
Charter is going to abide by any lesser legal obligation that is not self,enforcing?
The world should have learned from recent experiences with North Korea
and Iraq that, by itself, the NPT is not likely to prevent the unlawful
procurement of nuclear weapons. As has been noted time and again, that
"genie" is out of the bottle, and the basic technology is reportedly even
available in public libraries and on the Internet. Efforts to erect new legal
barriers to the possession, threat, or use of nuclear weapons-while not
necessarily unhelpful or a bad idea-risk missing the point that the primary
goal is to prevent war of any kind.
University of Iowa Professor Bums Weston is certainly one of th~ most
intelligent, articulate, and respected scholars in the "ban,the,bomb" campi
and in a 1989 address to the First World Congress of the International
Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms, Professor Weston observed: "to
rid ourselves of the nuclear habit we must rid ourselves also of the war habit. "148
Yet he acts as if there were no distinction between aggressor and victim,
contending that "nothing is more menacing to the long,term well,being of our
planet than the sincerely communicated threat to use nuclear weapons if and
when sufficiently provoked."149 He apparently sees no moral distinction, and
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no implication for the preservation of peace, between that "threat" being made
by someone like Saddam Hussein to compel peaceful Kuwait to submit to his
aggression, and such a "threat" being made by a State that is being "provoked"
by a flagrant act of armed international aggression and is acting under the
authority of a resolution of the Security Council, in order to dissuade the
aggressor from resorting to the illegal use of weapons of mass destruction that
might claim millions of innocent lives. 150 There is a difference.
Rather than permitting peaceloving States to use the threat151 of a nuclear
response to deter aggression and protect peace, Professor Weston would have
us disarm them of the weapons that have proven most effective in deterring
massive acts of international aggression for most of this century; suggesting in
the alternative that all the world really needs are a few new "mutual
nonaggression" pacts. In 1989 he wrote of the need for such treaties between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact,152 and between the United States and the Soviet
Union;153 and one might assume that today his solution to what might be called
the "Saddam Hussein problem" would be to get the Iraqi leader to sign a new
binding international agreement promising, henceforth, to be good.
Of course, Iraq is already a party to the UN Charter, the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, and various other solemn international treaties
which clearly prohibit the things Saddam has been doing (invading his
neighbors, developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, etc.); but
surely if we could just get him to sign one more piece of paper he would change
his ways-especially if we could assure him that his victims will no longer be
able to respond most effectively if he violates his promise.
The logic is so compelling that one can only wonder why the world didn't
think of it earlier? Imagine the lives that might have been saved had we just
been able to get Germany and Japan to ratify a binding international treaty
condemning "recourse to war for the solution of international controversies"
and renouncing war "as an instrument of national policy"154 a decade before the
outbreak of World War II. Readers who recall the optimism that greeted the
1928 Kellogg~Briand Pact may recall as well that it was solemnly ratified by
both Japan155 and Germany156-leading many people to conclude after the
outbreak of World War II that international law was inherently ineffective as
an instrument of peace. A better lesson to draw from this unfortunate
experience is that unenforced international law is an unreliable barrier to
aggression; 157 and a corollary may well be that aggression is encouraged when
law~abiding States are denied the legal right to seek to deter aggression with
their most effective legal weapons and the aid of other peaceloving States.
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Put simply, the (former) President of the World Court was mistaken when he
described nuclear weapons as being "the ultimate evil...."158 In this context, if
there is an "ultimate evil" it is probably the kind of armed international aggression
that results in the large,scale slaughter of innocent people and the subjugation of
human freedom. When nuclear weapons--or any weapons---are used for that
purpose, they are used in an evil manner. When they are used to dissuade potential
aggressors from slaughtering or enslaving their neighbors, they serve a positive
moral value. The weapons themselves have no inherent moral content. 159

The Military Utility of Nuclear Weapons
A central theme of much of the legal criticism of nuclear weapons is that,
because of their inherent nature, they have no legitimate military purpose or
value. Thus, States should not hesitate to give them up, and there is no
legitimate "cost" in banning them. For example, in his book Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons: The Relevance of International Law, Elliott L. Meyrowitz
asserts that "the nature and effect of nuclear weapons are such that they are
inherently incapable of being limited with any degree of certainty to a specific
military target.,,160 From such reasoning he concludes that "nuclear weapons
have no military utility.,,161
This is simply mistaken. Even if one were to assume that no State would ever
likely again elect to resort to such weapons during combat, it is a dangerous
fallacy to assume that weapons can have no utility or "military value" outside of
combat. Indeed, the great Chinese strategist Sun Tzu emphasized this point
well more than 2,500 years ago when he wrote: "For to win one hundred
victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy
without fighting is the acme of skill.,,162
A thorough discussion of the utility of nuclear weapons is far beyond the
scope of this short chapter, but two examples should suffice to establish the
point. The first is the critically important role that nuclear weapons obviously
played in keeping Europe at peace throughout the Cold War; and the second is
the successful use of the implied threat of a nuclear reprisal if Saddam Hussein
continued with his plans to use chemical or biological weapons during the
1990-91 Persian Gulf conflict.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Cold War. It is critically important to keep in
mind, as the world seeks relief from its fear of intentional or accidental nuclear
holocaust, that the world as a whole has seen a remarkable era of relative peace
for more than half,a,century, and that no single factor has likely played a more
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decisive role in bringing this about than the shared perception of the
unacceptability and futility of nuclear war and the realization that such an
outcome might be an unintended consequence of the escalation of any major
act of aggression by conventional weapons.
Conrad Harper, the Legal Adviser to the u.s. Department of State in 1995,
cautioned the Court that "nuclear deterrence has contributed substantially
during the past 50 years to the enhancement of strategic stability, the avoidance
of global conflict and the maintenance of international peace and security.,,163
Similarly, Sir Nicholas Lyell, Agent for the United Kingdom, observed:
[T]hese two requests [by the General Assembly and World Health
Organisation] ignore ... the somber but vital role played by nuclear weapons in
the system of international security over the past 50 years .... Our real world
remains a fragmented and dangerous place, and in this real world, to call in
question now the legal basis of the system of deterrence on which so many States
have relied for so long for the protection of their people could have a profoundly
destabilizing effect. l64

Perhaps no one formally involved in the case expressed this point more
eloquently than Judge Rosalyn Higgins (United Kingdom):
One cannot be unaffected by the knowledge of the unbearable suffering and vast
destruction that nuclear weapons can cause. And one can well understand that
it is expected of those who care about such suffering and devastation that they
should declare its cause illegal. It may well be asked of a judge whether, in
engaging in legal analysis of such concepts as "unnecessary suffering," "collateral
damage" and "entitlement to self-defence," one has not lost sight of the real
human circumstances involved. The judicialloadestar ... must be those values
that international law seeks to promote and protect. In the present case, it is the
physical survival of the peoples that we must constantly have in view. \Y/e live in
a decentralized world order, in which some States are known to possess nuclear
weapons but choose to remain outside of the non-proliferation treaty system;
while other such non-parties have declared their intention to obtain nuclear
weapons; and yet other States are believed clandestinely to possess, or to be
working shortly to possess nuclear weapons (some of whom indeed may be a
party to the NPT). It is not clear to me that either a pronouncement of illegality
in all circumstances of the use of nuclear weapons or the answers formulated by
the Court in paragraph 2E best serve to protect mankind against that
unimaginable suffering that we all fear. 165

Deterring Saddam's WMDs in the Gulf War. Anyone who doubts that the
threat of a nuclear response can deter wrongful conduct should read the
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Dissenting Opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case of then,World Court Vice
President (now President) Steven M. Schwebel (United States), who cites
chapter and verse in demonstrating that in 1990-91, American threats to
retaliate with nuclear weapons persuaded the Iraqi regime not to make use of
the 150 bombs and 25 ballistic,missile warheads filed with anthrax toxin that
had been specially prepared for use during the war. Judge Schwebel quotes at
length, for example, from a Washington Post article of26 August 1995:
Iraq has released to the United Nations new evidence that it was prepared to
use deadly toxins and bacteria against U.S. and allied forces during the 1991
Persian Gulf War that liberated Kuwait from its Iraqi occupiers, U.N.
Ambassador Rolf Ekeus said today.
Ekeus, the chief U.N. investigator of Iraq's weapons programs, said Iraqi
officials admitted to him in Baghdad last week that in December 1990 they
loaded three types of biological agents into roughly 200 missile warheads and
aircraft bombs that were then distributed to air bases and a missile site....
U.S. and U.N. officials said the Iraqi weapons contained enough biological
agents to have killed hundreds of thousands of people and spread horrible
diseases ....
Ekeus said Iraqi officials claimed they decided not to use the weapons after
receiving a strong but ambiguously worded warning from the Bush
administration on Jan. 9, 1991, that any use of unconventional warfare would
provoke a devastating response.
Iraq's leadership assumed this meant Washington would retaliate with
nuclear weapons, Ekeus said he was told. 166

Judge Schwebel also quotes from an interview with Iraqi Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz on the u.S. public television program Frontline, in which Aziz was
asked why the expected chemical attack on u.S. forces "never came." He
replied: "We didn't think that it was wise to use them. That's all what I can say.
That was not-was not wise to use such kind of weapons in such kind of a war
with-with such an enemy."167
After placing on the record an abundance of evidence of the impact on Iraqi
policy of the American threatl68 to retaliate with nuclear weapons in the event
of an Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction (even though such a response
had apparently been eliminated as an option before the war started169), Judge
Schwebel concluded:
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Thus there is on record remarkable evidence indicating that an aggressor was or
may have been deterred from using outlawed weapons of mass destruction
against forces and countries arrayed against its aggression at the call of the
United Nations by what the aggressor perceived to be a threat to use nuclear
weapons against it should it first use weapons of mass destruction against the
forces of the coalition. Can it seriously be maintained that Mr. Baker's
calculated-and apparently successful-threat was unlawful? Surely the
principles of the United Nations Charter were sustained rather than transgressed
by the threat. 17o

The Characteristics of Modem Nuclear Weapons. For perhaps understandable
reasons, governments are reluctant to discuss publicly the details of their most
sensitive military programs. Former government officials and employees who
have been granted access to highly classified defense programs are usually
prohibited from discussing such details as well. Having been personally
involved-quite uns~ccessfully-in trying to persuade the United States
Government to declassify persuasive evidence in connection with an earlier ICJ
case more than a dozen years ago,l7l the present writer is not completely
surprised that the official submissions to the Court did not focus on the
technical details of the latest generation of nuclear weapons. Perhaps the
strongest statement in this regard was by the Government of the United
Kingdom, which told the Court:
[M]uch of the writing on nuclear weapons on which these arguments rely dates
from the 1950's and early 1960's. Modem nuclear weapons are capable of far
more precise targeting and can therefore be directed against specific military
objectives without the indiscriminate effect on the civilian population which the
older literature assumed to be inevitable.172

Many references to the nature of nuclear weapons in presentations to the
Court, and even portions of the Court's opinion,173 suggest that this
observation by the United Kingdom is correct. Not all "nuclear weapons" are
identical. The Soviet Union, for example, once designed a nuclear weapon
with a yield of 150 megatons and tested one with a yield of approximately 50
megatons. l74 Identifying a use for such weapons consistent with the law of
armed conflict would be extremely difficult, and most possible uses of a weapon
capable of 1/100th of that level of destructiveness might well conflict with the
law-particularly if used anywhere near a concentration of noncombatants.
But the reported trend in the latest generation of nuclear weapons is towards
much smaller and far more accurate devices, and it is these devices that must
be considered-in the light of all of the circumstances of a given situation-in
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effort to inquire into the characteristics of such weapons,175 apparently finding
it more convenient to make assumptions based upon knowledge acquired in
earlier decades and undocumented assertions made by critics who quite likely
were also not privy to information on highly classified defense programs of the
nuclear,weapons States.
Thus, the President of the Court concluded that:
Nuclear weapons can be expected-in the present state of scientific
development at least-to cause indiscriminate victims among combatants and
non-combatants alike, as well as unnecessary suffering among both categories.
The very nature of this blind weapon therefore has a destabilizing effect on
hUlllanitarian law which regulates discernment in the type of weapon used ....
Until scientists are able to develop a "clean" nuclear weapon which would
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, nuclear weapons will
clearly have indiscriminate effects and constitute an absolute challenge to
humanitarian law. 176

The present writer has had no access to classified information on this topic
in well over a decade, but judging from readily available press reports it seems
likely that modem nuclear weapons have already satisfied this requirement. A
report in Time magazine in connection with the recent confrontation between
Saddam Hussein and the UN Security Council, for example, noted that "New
weapons with ever increasing accuracy led the Pentagon to be confident that
few will stray, thus limiting what military euphemists refer to as 'collateral
damage'-innocent, but dead, civilians."177 It notes that in the September
1995 attacks on Bosnian Serb strongholds that led to the Dayton Accord, the
Air Force reported 97 percent accuracy of its "smart bombs"-far superior to
the success record in Operation Desert Storm less than five years earlier. By
using Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites for guidance (rather than
lasers, which could be thrown off target by smoke or bad weather), and new
high,tech fuses that can actually "count" floors in an underground bunker and
explode only upon reaching a pre,selected level, the United States had
achieved weapons of unprecedented accuracy.178
Because of the increased accuracy, most targets can be defeated by the use of
conventional high-explosive warheads, such as the GBU,28 179 and GBU,3S 180
S,OOO-pound "bunker busters;" however, the highly regarded Aviation Week &
Space Technology quotes a retired senior Air Force general as saying "You can't
attack all the chemical and biological weapons storage sites" in Iraq, because
"[s]ome are too far underground .... "181
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Frank Robbins, Director of the Precision Strike Weapons Technology
Office at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, was quoted in Defense Week as stating
that GPS,guided munitions "could hit a target the size of a man's upper torso
within a metropolitan area as large as ... Washington,Baltimore.,,182 However,
when that man's upper torso,size target is buried deeply underground, below
the range of any conventional weapon that can be carried by the latest U.S.
bombers,183 the only means of deterring a foreign tyrant considering launching
an aggressive war--or neutralizing his supply of weapons of mass destruction
before they can be fired at the civilian populations of neighboring States-may
be with a nuclear warhead.
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reported in late 1997 that the United
States had earlier that year deployed the B61 earth,penetrating nuclear
warhead to destroy "superhardened" or "deeply buried" targets "with great
precision and bewildering agility, no matter their location.,,184 The article
asserts that the United States is seeking the ability to destroy "underground
targets, with greater discrimination," for possible counterproliferation
purposes, and that one recent report by nuclear weapons experts suggests that
"a small nuclear warhead [like the B61] is the best way to neutralize anthrax
agents." The present writer emphasizes that he has no personal knowledge
about any of these programs, but assuming for the moment that these generally
well, connected sources are correct, they identify critically important military
missions which might not be achievable through the use of conventional
ordinance. While it is obvious that the legality of any particular use of such
weapons must be determined in the context of the purpose for which it is used,
projected collateral damage, and other considerations, it is equally clear that
not every use of such weapons would be unlawful. Indeed, one could easily
conceive of settings in which such a use of nuclear weapons would claim few if
any noncombatant lives, while in the process saving millions oflives that might
otherwise be vulnerable to weapons of mass destruction.
Once again, the utility of such weapons must also be evaluated in terms of
their contribution to maintaining peace by deterring potential aggressors from
initiating conflict. If small nuclear weapons make it possible for the United
States to place the potential aggressor State's leadership at risk, and to
neutralize an anthrax bomb before it can harm anyone, this serves both to
diminish the perceived value of anthrax weapons and to place at personal risk
decision makers who may be contemplating threatening the peace. Both of
these consequences are highly desirable-irrespective of whether such
weapons would ever actually be used in combat.

344

Robert F. Turner
Perhaps it was inevitable-and even wise-for the Court to refrain from
making a detailed speculative inquiry into the technological characteristics of
modern nuclear weapons. But without doing so, the Court obviously lacked the
knowledge necessary to draw legal conclusions based upon the application of
the legal principles it had identified as being germane to the threat or use of
these weapons. Its conclusions must therefore be considered in the light of this
shortcoming.
There are some very able, knowledgeable, and respected military
professionals who have concluded that nuclear weapons are unnecessary and
inherently immoral. l85 Their technical understanding of such weapons is far
superior to that of the present writer, and in terms of the actual use of such
weapons they may well be right. Surely, anyone with an ounce of sense realizes
that nuclear war would be horrible beyond description. But precisely because of
their perceived horror, the existence of these weapons has ironically thus far
been a powerful force for world peace. And with admitted exceptions, military
and political leaders in the democracies who know the most about these
weapons continue to believe they have military utility.186

Nuclear Weapons as a Force for Peace
Perhaps it is time for a "reality check." Strategic nuclear weapons are
capable of incomprehensible devastation, and it doesn't require a World Court
decision to make this point. It is not coincidental that they have not been used
a single time in more than half,a,century since they were first developed and
used to bring an end to World War II. One can only pray that they will never
have to be used again.
But one can also look back at the Cold War era and realize that the world
might well be a far different place today had such frightening weapons not been
introduced into national inventories. They have imposed a level of sanity on
world leaders who otherwise had considerable incentives to promote violent
change. Largely because of the respect among decision makers on all sides for
the consequences of nuclear conflict, an unstable political confrontation that
might easily have resulted in World War III was replaced by nearly
half,a,century of political struggle and occasional detente, punctuated on
occasion by relatively minor lS7 coercive settings on the periphery of the
presumptive battlefield.
The foes of nuclear weapons will not acknowledge it, but it is quite probable
that the existence of nuclear weapons was the single most important factor in
keeping Europe at peace for nearly half,a,century following World War
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II-longer than Europe had experienced peace in many centuries. To be sure,
the standoff was frightening and the risks of error were horrific; but the
existence of a nuclear,armed NATO probably saved tens of millions of lives in
Europe alone.

Complete Disarmament Is an Impractical Dream
In a 1793 letter to James Monroe, Thomas Jefferson remarked, with his
characteristic perception: "I believe that through all America there has been
but a single sentiment on the subject of peace and war, which was in favor of
the former .... We have differed, perhaps, as to the tone of conduct exactly
adapted to secure it."ISS We may also have differed on the price to be paid for it,
for as John Stuart Mill once noted:
War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things: the decayed and degraded state
of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks nothing worth a war, is worse .... A
man who has nothing which he is willing to fight for, nothing which he cares
more about than he does about his personal safety, is a miserable creature who
has no chance of being free, unless made and kept so by the exertions of better
men than himself.Is9

Who doesn't want peace? No rational, sane citizen of any country favors war
when peace can be had without price, and the vision of a world without war is
enticing. A simple-perhaps overly so--logic suggests that since wars are
fought with weapons, if we can just rid the world of weapons we can guarantee
peace. Wars, by this theory, result largely from the existence of weapons and
from military imbalances which promise benefits for the strong. (The wisdom of
this theory is easily established by reviewing the past two centuries of
U.s.,Canadian relations.)
Since we all in principle favor peace and would welcome a world in which all
beings lived in peace and respected the rights of others, it follows that we would
incorporate the aspirational goal of general and complete disarmament in
precatory language designed to make everyone feel good at the conclusion of a
less ambitious effort to control instruments of war-as was apparently done in
Article VI of the NPT.190 This is not to suggest that the parties were disingenuous
in committing to pursue negotiations "on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control"-presumably
every peaceloving State would favor such a goal, if the control machinery were
certain to be effective and could be implemented without totally undermining
the sovereignty of individual States and the privacy of their citizens-but it is
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likely that only the most naive delegates anticipated witnessing the conclusion
of such an agreement in their own lifetimes.
Professor Richard B. Bilder is but one of many respected commentators to
observe that the "nuclear genie" is "out of the bottle," and that "[t]here are
already over 50,000 of those weapons, knowledge of how to build them will
never disappear.... "191 Certain chemical and biological weapons are even
simpler to build and to conceal. The inability of the world community to
control illicit drugs provides some insight to this dilemma, and much of that
activity takes place despite serious efforts by host States to prevent it. Those
who recall the experience of the Gulf War will realize that it is necessary to be
able to send inspectors not only to established military installations and
chemical or medical laboratories, but also to inspect such places as "baby milk"
factories 192-and quite likely alleged "religious" and "cultural" properties as
well. Indeed, one might anticipate that if any single category of facility were
declared "off limits" for inspectors, that would be the most attractive place to
engage in prohibited behavior.
One would certainly expect a clever leader who wished to engage in covert
development and production of prohibited weapons to try to "raise the costs of
inspection" by concealing such activities in locations that might prove
embarrassing for foreigners to enter, and then to use political warfare
techniques to intimidate and· discredit the inspectors if they nevertheless
endeavored to do their job. At the same time, potential violators would
presumably demand the most intrusive inspections within democratic
States-both as an intelligence,gathering technique and as a means of
pressuring other States to accept what might be called "informal
accommodations" which would lessen the mutual inconvenience of
inspections {and probably in the process make them virtually meaningless).193
Professor Almond has observed: "Because disarmament agreements are very
difficult to verify without major intrusions into the territory of each of the
parties, the possibility of concluding such an agreement is slight."194 Other
experts have made similar points. 195 It is also clear that the closer one comes to
total disarmament, the more significant a small amount of "cheating" becomes
and thus the greater the incentive to cheat. In a world with tens of thousands of
nuclear weapons, a State that can covertly manufacture half,a,dozen nuclear
devices is not going to dramatically transform the balance of power-especially
if the Security Council can remain functional. But if alllaw,abiding countries
eliminate all of their nuclear weapons-and, pursuant to the Court's
interpretation of Article VI of the NPT, their conventional weapons as
well-then the incentives for an ambitious tyrant to secretly build a small
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inventory of prohibited weapons are considerably enhanced. A tyrant with a
global monopoly on weapons of mass destruction, and a willingness to actually
use them, would be a powerful actor indeed. So, in the absence of "strict and
effective international control" to guarantee (assuming that were even
theoretically possible) that no State was "breaking the rules," an unenforceable
agreement requiring States to destroy all nuclear weapons (or all weapons of
any kind) could well prove highly counterproductive to such Charter values as
international peace, human dignity, and freedom.
Today, any tyrant contemplating building nuclear weapons for aggressive
purposes must consider the assurances of the world's strongest military powers
that they will come to the defense of any NPT party that is' a victim of
aggression or a threat of aggression involving nuclear weapons. 196 That is a
fairly strong disincentive: Why bother to build a small nuclear stockpile to
harass your neighbors if the immediate consequence will be to bring you into
conflict with the major nuclear powers? We must ask why the World Court
seems so anxious to undermine this disincentive, in the process increasing the
relative political and military value of a small stock of illicit nuclear weapons
(and thus the incentive to acquire them) perhaps a thousand,fold?
Any country that pretends to take seriously the vision of general and
complete disarmament ought first to be willing to demonstrate the
effectiveness of such a concept at the national level. Let them first take the
guns and clubs from their own military and police forces, remove all kitchen
knives from their homes, and display for the world to admire a functioning
utopian model of universal peace and tranquillity without the threat or use of
force. (To paraphrase a comment once made about the practical shortcomings
of socialism: "nice idea; wrong species.") Until that is done, the serious business
of trying to promote a more peaceful world ought not be distracted by such silly,
dangerous, illusions.

G

iven the political nature of the entire process, and the risk that under
pressure from so,called "peace" groups, NGOs, and numerous
Third,World States, the Court would have ignored the law and pronounced a
dangerous new doctrine limiting the rights of States to use nuclear weapons to
deter aggression and defend themselves and their allies if necessary, one must
on balance view the advisory opinion with relief and some satisfaction.
Basically, the Court got the law right. It overwhelmingly concluded that there
is no conventional prohibition per se against the threat or use of nuclear
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weapons, and similarly found no rule of customary law to support the position
embodied in the General Assembly Resolution. It also quite properly noted
that, like all weapons, nuclear weapons may not be used in violation of jus ad
bellum or jus in bello-such as to commit aggression against a prohibited target
or in a manner disproportional or unnecessary to the legitimate defensive needs
of a particular situation. It also noted that the highly destructive nature of such
weapons, and the commonly associated collateral effects like fallout and
radioactive contamination, clearly made such weapons unsuitable for any but
the most serious of settings. From the standpoint of its proper function and the
rules of international law, had the opinion stopped there it would have been
not only unobjectionable but quite commendable.
From a political standpoint, however, such an opinion would have been less
than ideal, as it would have constituted a complete rejection of the views of the
countries and NGOs that had championed the initiative. While the Court's
courage in resisting political pressure on the fundamental legal issues raised by
the request is commendable, its decision to go further and include language
apparently carefully designed to placate this considerable political bloc (and
presumably the personal preferences of several of the judges) is regrettable. The
decision led the Court first to depart from the judicial task of identifying and
applying legal principles to specific facts associated with the highly technical
and secretive field of modem nuclear weapons technology for which it lacked
both the necessary factual information and the scientific expertise to make
meaningful judgments; and secondly to gratuitously address an issue that had
not been part of the request-and, more sadly still, to arrive unanimously at the
wrong answer.
As has been discussed, the Court's speculation about possible uses of nuclear
weapons that might comply with existing jus in bellum quickly took the judges
into a realm where they lacked sufficient expertise or information to make
sound judgments. Apparently (and understandably) not being familiar with the
characteristics of the latest generation of nuclear weapons, the Court seems to
have assumed that any such weapons would necessarily and indiscriminately
slaughter hundreds of thousands if not millions of combatants and
noncombatants alike; and trying to hypothesize any scenario in which such
conduct would not conflict with the laws governing military operations was, not
surprisingly, difficult.
Trying to emphasize the extreme nature of any such exception, the Court
spoke in terms of defending against a threat to the survival of a State-which is
not a bad example of a situation in which resort to a nuclear weapon might be
justified. But it is hardly the only example. It would seem clear, for example,
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that a victim of aggression that concluded that the use of nuclear weapons
against an aggressor's underground stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction
(or hardened military delivery systems for such weapons) was the only defense
likely to save the lives of tens of millions of its citizens-even though the State
might ultimately "survive" with even half of its original population-would be
permitted under international law to make use of such weapons. The mere
threat of such a defensive response is still less objectionable as a means of
dissuading aggressive intentions.
As an aside, some confusion may result from a misreading of the quite
accurate and important language in paragraph 47 of the Court's opinion
linking the lawfulness of a "threat" to use force with the underlying question of
whether the actual use of force in that setting is permissible under the Charter.
The Court concluded:
The notions of "threat" and "use" of force under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the
Charter stand together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case is
illegal-for whatever reason-the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal.
In short, if it is to be lawful, the declared readiness of a State to use force must be
a use of force that is in conformity with the Charter. 197

This is correct. But it does not follow that this rule-which governs jus ad
bellum and is associated with Article 2 (4) of the Charter-applies in analyzing a
threat or use of force under jus in bello. A State is required to consider the
probable magnitude and risk of collateral damage to noncombatants when
deciding whether it is lawful to attack an otherwise lawful military target, and
for that reason, some tyrants find it convenient to place important military
targets in the middle of population centers-presumably hoping that even if it
remains "legal" for a country like the United States to attack the target (which
it generally does), considerations of humanity and more pragmatic concerns of
public opinion will act as a deterrent. But a threat to use nuclear (or other)
weapons in a defensive response to armed aggression does not endanger the
interests protected by international humanitarian law. 198 Since, as already
noted, the aggressive threat or use of nuclear weapons is already prohibited by
the Charter, any analysis of potential defensive behavior needs to discriminate
between actual use (which must comply with jus in bello) and expressed or
implied threats aimed at enhancing deterrence. Deterring armed international
aggression, after all, is an important Charter value.
The legal test that ought to be used in responding to the General Assembly's
question is not whether the Court majority successfully anticipated every
future act of aggression which might legally be met with a particular defensive
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nuclear response, but whether in every given situation the use of such weapons
necessarily violates some governing legal principle. The Court's ignorance
about recent (or future) technological developments in the characteristics of
nuclear weapons does not alter the principle legal conclusions of the opinion.
The proper test of the lawfulness of nuclear weapons is precisely the same as the
test applied to any other weapon that has not been expressly banned: Does the
action under all of the relevant circumstances violate any applicable provision
of international law?
Applying this test, it is abundantly clear that:
Nuclear weapons may not be used aggressively, or in any other manner contrary
to a State's relevant treaty commitmentsj
Nuclear weapons may not be used contrary to any applicable rule of customary
international law binding upon the State considering their usej199
Nuclear weapons may not be used against targets prohibited by international
lawj 2°O
Nuclear weapons may not be used even defensively except consistent with the
legal rules which constrain the use of all force in self-defense and collective
self-defense, such as necessity, proportionality, and discrimination.

These principles are uncontroversial, unobjectionable, and fully consistent
with United States military doctrine dating back more than four decades. 201
Beyond that, the Court's speculation that the horrendous inherent
characteristics of all nuclear weapons would preclude any use from satisfying
these legal tests that did not involve a threat to "the very survival of a State" is
only legally meaningful to the extent that the Court's comprehension of the
nature of such weapons-today and tomorrow-was accurate. The legally
significant point to the opinion is the test to be applied, not the prescience of
the judges in foreseeing every conceivable circumstances that might threaten a
State in the years ahead, or their perspicacity in understanding current military
technology. To the extent the Court's uninformed and speculative
inquiry-one might better say noninquiry, as there was little evidence of serious
inquiry in the opinion-into the technical nature of modem nuclear weapons
was unsoundly premised, the legal conclusions seven of the fourteen judges
drew from that factual predicate are of little value. They certainly do not
constitute binding rules limiting the conduct of States.
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As much as the sponsors of the General Assembly request may have wished,
once the Court properly recognized that neither conventional nor customary
international law prohibits the defensive threat or use of nuclear weapons (so
long as such conduct complies with the law of armed conflict), the Court
clearly lacked the authority to modify those legal rules to conform to the
political preferences of members of the Court or a plurality of members of the
United Nations. Therefore, the Court's subsequent speculation about possible
settings in which the use of such weapons would comply with the laws of armed
conflict may have been a useful reminder of the potential horror of nuclear
weapons, but to the extent it was premised upon factual error or limited vision,
it is of no legal significance. The test remains whether a threat or use of nuclear
weapons is consistent with the relevant rules of international law under all of
the specific circumstances in which it occurs. It is a good test, and it is precisely
the test that the United States has long recognized as controlling. The fact that
the judges who most strongly favored a per se prohibition on the threat or use of
nuclear weapons found it necessary to dissent from the majority opinion stands
in clear refutation of the "spin control" efforts of antinuclear activists to portray
the advisory opinion in a light more favorable to their political perspective. The
clear reality is that they lost, and, as ironic as it may seem to some, the cause of
international peace and effective deterrence emerges clearly victorious from a
proper reading of the case.
Notes
1. This does not include all of the thirty-five countries which earlier submitted opinions in
the companion request by the World Health Organization for an advisory opinion, which was
rejected by the World Court as exceeding the proper jurisdiction of the organization.
2. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which by the Constitution is limited to deciding
"cases" or "controversies" (U.S. CONST. art. III, §2) the \X'orld Court is expressly authorized to
give nonbinding "advisory opinions" to the Security Council, General Assembly, and other UN
organs to assist them in fulfilling their own responsibilities. See U.N. CHARTER art. 96; I.C.J.
STAT. arts. 65-68.
3. The CND "Information Officer" wrote in a letter to the editor: "I sat in the
International Court of Justice while it ruled that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was illegal
under international law." Letters, THE INDEPENDENT (London), July 11, 1996, at 17. See also,
Christopher Bellamy, World Takes First Steps to Ban the Bomb, id. July 9, 1996, at 1 ("Last night,
anti-nuclear pressure groups, including CND, were claiming victory....J>). The CND web page
(http://mcb.netlcnd/cndtoday/winter97J) includes an article from eND Today (\X'inter 1997)
which interprets the case as establishing that "The threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal in
all conceivable circumstances," and notes that "The Court ... found no nuclear weapon which
could comply" with international humanitarian law. (Of course, by similar reasoning, one might
note that the Court did not identify any nuclear weapon which could not under any
circumstances comply, but how many people will read the actual case?) Interestingly, the article
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asserts that individuals being prosecuted in European courts for "serious anti-nuclear actions"
(e.g., destroying government property) were successfully citing as a defense the IC] Nuclear
Weapons case.
For readers who are not familiar with the CND, it was the original
"ban-the-bomb" group established in Great Britain more than four decades ago and is perhaps
most famous for having originated the so-called "peace sign," using a black circle around a
vertical line with what might be described as an inverted "V" joining the line in the center. This
symbol represents the international semaphore flag code for the letters N (flags extended
downward on both sides at 45 degree angles from the legs) and D (left flag down, right flag above
head--creating the appearance of a vertical line), signifying "Nuclear Disarmament."
4. A Greenpeace spokesman declared that "The ruling, in fact, means that any use or
threat to use nuclear weapons could be in breach of international law, " and declared the opinion
to be "much stronger than I expected." Disarmament: World Court Decision "Misunderstood,"
INTER PRESS SERVICE, July 10, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10768077.
5. The American co-president of this group characterized the opinion as "much better
than what we expected." Jonathan C. Randal, World Court: Nuclear A17TlS Mostly Illegal, WASH.
POST, July 9, 1996, at A12.
6. This statement is based upon personal conversations by the writer with lawyers who
took part in arguing the case.
7. For an excellent summary of the background to both the WHO and UNGA resolutions,
see, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 3 Ouly 8) [hereinafter cited as
Nuclear Weapons], (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda at 3-23). See also Lt Col Michael N.
Schmitt, USAF, The International Court ofJustice and the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 51 (2) NAVAL
WARC. REv. 91, 92-94 (Spring 1998); and Nuclear Weapons, Statement of the Government of
the United Kingdom, June 1995, part II at 3-5.
8. Japan Mum on World Court Refusal to Rule on Nuke Use, KYODO NEWS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., July 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7593453.

9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Asides: In Their Opinion (editorial), WALL ST. J., July 15, 1996, at A12
(characterizing the case as ruling "that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is not only really
bad, but also illegal according to international law."). See also, Thalif Deen, Use of Nuclear
Weapons Illegal, Says World Court, JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, July 17, 1996, at 4 (quoting
Daniel Ellsberg).
11. For a discussion of the Court's handling of this case, see Peter H. F. Bekker, Dismissal of
Request by World Health Organization for Advisory Opinion on Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 91 AM.
J. INT'L L. 134 (1997).
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 96 ("The General Assembly ... may request the International
Court ofJustice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.").
13. The General Assembly is not a "legislative" body and its resolutions, by themselves, do
not create or determine international law (except to the extent it is empowered to make binding
decisions having to do with the functioning of the organization).
14. G.A. Res. 1653 (XVI).
15. The 1961 resolution, for example, passed by a vote of 56 to 19, with 26 abstentions.
16. G.A. Res. 33filB, Dec. 14, 1978 (emphasis added).
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 18 (referring to a majority or two-thirds majority "of the members
present and voting." (Emphasis added.) While one might argue that registering an abstention
during the electronic voting process nevertheless constitutes a "vote" for purposes of Article 18,
the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly define this language of the Charter to exclude
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abstentions. U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev.15, Rule 86 (1985), quoted in Paul C. Szasz, Addendum: The
Vote in the General Assembly, 91 AM.]. INT'L L. 133 n.3 (1997).
18. "Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a
two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include:
recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security...."
U.N. CHARTER art. 18(2}.
19. Szasz, supra note 17, at 134.
20. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.e.I.]., (ser. A), No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept. 7).
21. "[lln international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by
the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State
can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without exception." Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Merits), 1986 I.C.]. 4 Oune 27), para. 269.
22. See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons (written submissions of the United Kingdom at 21, and the
Russian Federation at 5).
23. Nuclear Weapons, para. 22.
24. Id., para. 52.
25. Nuclear Weapons (Declaration of President Bedjaoui at para. 13).
26. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
27. I am indebted to my colleague John Norton Moore for perceiving this reality more than
a decade ago. See John Norton Moore, Nuclear Weapons and the Law: Enhancing Strategic
Stability, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW 54 (Arthur Selwyn Miller & Martin Feinrider eds.,
1984). The Russian Government also emphasized the importance of distinguishing between
offensive and defensive uses of nuclear weapons. Nuclear Weapons, "\Vritten Statement and
Comments of the Russian Federation on the Issue of the Legality of the Thre.at or Use of Nuclear
Weapons," Moscow, June 16, 1995, at 5.
28. The writer is not suggesting that there are no dangers inherent in predicating world
peace upon the hope that rational leaders will always be deterred from aggression by the
knowledge that initiating a war might even unintentionally lead to nuclear holocaust. To be
sure, this is a frightening thought. But one might also be concerned about legal efforts to
undermine the ability of the world community to dissuade potential aggressors from initiating
war in the first place. The impact of this decision on deterrence and peace is addressed infra, at
notes 127-160 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., infra note 165 and accompanying text.
30. "The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of
whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to
make such a request." I.e.]. STAT. art. 65(1) (emphasis added).
31. See infra notes 127-188 and accompanying text.
32. This is true unless the parties to a contentious case elect to submit a dispute for the
Court to decide ex aequo et bono pursuant to Article 38(2) of the I.C.]. Statute.
33. Nuclear Weapons, para. 18.
34. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 108.
35. Nuclear Weapons, para. 86.
36. Id., paras. 37-39.
37. See, e.g., id. paras. 22, 85, 86 ("None of the statements made before the Court in any way
advocated a freedom to use nuclear weapons without regard to humanitarian constraints.").
38. Id., paras. 24-25.
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39. Id., paras. 27-33.
40. Id., para. 55 ("The practice is clear, and the parties to those instruments have not
treated them as referring to nuclear weapons.").
41. Id., para. 26.
42. These are discussed in id., paras. 58 &59. For the text and background to some of these
instruments, see U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS (1996). For an excellent summary of international agreements
declaring certain regions to be "nuclear-free zones," see Mark E. Rosen, Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zones, NAVAL WARC. REv., Autumn 1996, at 47-55.
43. Nuclear Weapons, para. 62.
44. Id., para. 62.
45. Id., paras. 79, 83.
46. Indeed, as the Russian Government was quick to point out, the World Health
Organization virtually conceded the lack of a customary ban in noting that "over the last 38 years
marked differences of opinion have been expressed by Member States about the lawfulness of the
use of nuclear weapons." Quoted in Nuclear Weapons, "\Vritten Statement and Comments of the
Russian Federation on the Issue of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,"
Moscow, June 16, 1995, at 17. The Russians also noted that one of the reasons States are
negotiating various international agreements placing limits on certain deployments or uses of
nuclear weapons is because they recognize that there is no established customary norm, which, if
it existed, would make the treaties unnecessary. Id. at 7.
47. Nuclear Weapons, para. 67.
48. Decisions of the General Assembly do have legal effect in certain specified areas, such
as in setting the contributions to be paid each year by member States.
49. Nuclear Weapons, para. 71.
50. This may be optimistic. While one would hope that no government would contemplate
using a nuclear weapon against its own nationals, the same thing might have been said about the
use of other weapons of mass destruction until Saddam Hussein actually did so.
51. Nuclear Weapons, para. 50.
52. While activist scholars have in recent years produced a number of books and articles
arguing that there is a "fundamental need to erect an international legal structure" to outlaw
nuclear weapons, or calling for "an effort to create a legal regime for the reduction and
elimination of nuclear weapons" as a "high priority," and a relatively small number assert that
existing treaties already effectively outlaw any threat or use of nuclear weapons, there is certainly
no consensus among "the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations" that
international custom already imposes a per se ban on the threat or use of nuclear weapons. See,
e.g., ELLIOTT L. MEYROWITZ, PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR \XlEAPONS: THE RELEVANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 197, 204, 205 (1990); NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW 5-6 (Professor
Richard B. Builder), 52 (Professor John Norton Moore), & 58 (Professor Harry Almond)
(Arthur Selwyn Miller & Martin Feinrider eds., 1984); and Lori Fisler Darnrosch, Banning the
Bomb: Law and Its Umits, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 653, 667 (1986).
53. Nuclear Weapons (Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Schwebel at 13).
54. Nuclear Weapons, para. 105 (2) (A).
55. Id., para. 105(2)(C).
56. Id., para. 105(2)(D).
57. See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons, "Written Comments of the Government of the United
States of America on the Submissions of Other States," June 20, 1995, at 34 ("The United States
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has long taken the position that various principles of the international law of armed conflict
would apply to the use of nuclear weapons as well as to other means and methods of warfare.").
58. Nuclear Weapons, para. 105(2) (B).
59. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
60. Nuclear Weapons, para. 105(2) (E).
61. "All questions shall be decided by a majority of the judges present." I.C.J. STAT. art.
55(1).
62. Id., art. 55(2).
63. rd. (Declaration of President Bedjaoui), para. 19. One might have thought that slavery,
torture, or genocide might better qualify as "the ultimate evil."
64. I.C.]. STAT. art. 68.
65. It is not here suggested that the Court should alter its own procedural rules from case to
case, but rather that a reasonable argument can be made that tie votes in connection with
advisory opinions do not necessarily need to be artificially "broken" by permitting one judge to
vote twice. Contentious cases may pertain to impassioned disputes which, if left unresolved,
might lead to unpleasantness and even hostilities. A just and impartial resolution of such
disputes may be important, and if dispassionate experts are evenly divided on which party is in
the legally superior position, and a compromise solution is impractical, it may even be useful (and
fair) to essentially have the Court "flip a coin" to resolve the matter. A United Nations agency
seeking a nonbinding advisory opinion could presumably adjust to the reality that the members
of the World Court are evenly divided upon a legal question.
66. Implicit or explicit here would be the point that if a "nuclear weapon" existed or was
developed that either lacked, or greatly reduced, the devastating characteristics normally
associated with such weapons, a different conclusion might result from the application of the
governing legal principles to the facts of that specific weapon and the circumstances in which it
was being threatened or used.
67. CHARLES DICKENS, OUYER TWIST 354 (Kathleen Tillotson ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1966). See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
6&. Nuclear Weapons, para. 96 (emphasis added).
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
70. 95 CONGo REC. 8892 (1949) (statement of Sen. Vandenberg).
71. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE COMM.
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 349-350 (1945) (statement of John Foster
Dulles, official adviser to United States delegation at San Francisco). The Russian Government
noted in its written statement to the Court that "the Charter does not impair in any sense the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations.... " Written Statement and Comments of the Russian Federation on the
Issue of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Moscow, June 16, 1995, at 8.
This translation was confirmed by the Russian Federation Mission to the United
Nations in New York by telephone.
73. When questions were raised about whether the Kellogg-Briand Pact would restrict the
right of States to use force in self-defense, the United States sent a diplomatic note to all
countries being invited to sign the treaty which read in part: "There is nothing in the American
draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defence. That
right is inherent in every sovereign State and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all
times and regardless of treaty proviSions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it·
alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense. . ..
Express recognition by treaty of this inalienable right, however, gives rise to the same difficulty
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encountered in any effort to define aggression." Quoted in DOCUMENTS ON NATIONAL
SECURITY LAw 139 n.2 Oohn Norton Moore, Guy B. Roberts & Robert F. Turner eds.,
1995)(emphasis added).
74. Nuclear Weapons (Separate Opinion of]udge F1eischhauer at 3).
75. Id. (Declaration of President Bedjaoui at para. 22).
76. The United Nations was established in the final months of World War II for the primary
purpose of avoiding World War III, and the very first purpose identified in Article I is "to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace...." U.N.
CHARTER art. I, sect. 1.
77. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
78. Consider this excerpt from the Declaration of President Bedjaoui: "Humanity is
subjecting itself to a perverse and unremitting nuclear blackmail. The question is how to put a
stop to it. The Court had a duty to play its part, however small, in this rescue operation for
humanity. . .. This very important question of nuclear weapons proved alas to be an area in
which the Court had to acknowledge that there is no immediate and clear answer to the question
put to it. It is to be hoped that the international community ... will endeavour as quickly as
possible to correct the imperfections of an international law which is ultimately no more than the
creation of the States themselves. The Court will at least have had the merit of pointing out
these imperfections and calling upon international society to correct them." Nuclear Weapons
(Declaration of President Bedjaoui at paras. 6, 8).
79. The Court also sought to narrow this right in the Paramilitary Activities Case. See Robert
F. Turner, Peace and the World Court, 20 VAND. J. TRANs. L. 53, 69-70 (1987).
80. The Court elected not to address the lawfulness of a proportional use of nuclear
weapons as a belligerent reprisal to an armed attack with weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear
Weapons, para. 47.
81. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed on July I, 1988,21 U.S.T.
483.
82. U.S. ARMs CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS: TEXTS AND HISTORIES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 93-94 (1996).
83. Nuclear Weapons (Dissenting Opinion of]udge Oda at 29).
84. Nuclear Weapons, para. 105(2)F.
85. This point has been observed by commentators and was also noted in Nuclear Weapons
(Minority Opinion of Vice President Schwebel at 13; Separate Opinion ofJudge Fleischhauer at

4).
86. G.A. Res. 51/45 M, Dec. 10, 1996 (adopted bya vote of 115-22-32) (emphasis added).
87. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,signedonJuly 1,1988,21 U.S.T.
483.

88. Nuclear Weapons, paras. 99-100 (emphasis added).
89. If the Court perceives a legal duty to conclude an agreement, it presumably must be able
to articulate at least the basic provisions of that agreement. Were it nothing more than an
agreement to destroy all of their nuclear or other weapons, that might be manageable; but
Article VI speaks in terms of attempting to negotiate "effective measures ... under strict and
effective international control." (Emphasis added.) Where is the Court to tum in ascertaining a set
of objective treaty terms to accomplish this goal? Can anyone say with a straight face that the
States which ratified the NPTwould have done so had they been informed that the World Court
would arbitrarily impose a set of terms to satisfy the "strict and effective international control"
requirement of Article VI-terms which would either be extremely intrusive on traditional
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principles of national sovereignty or would likely prove ineffective in safeguarding the security of
those States? Such an idea is simply not credible.
90. \lienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. NCONF. 39/27 (1969), 8I.L.M.
679 (1969).
91. Article 2(4} of the UN Charter would prohibit States from attempting to coerce other
States to sign an agreement (which would in any event be void ab initio under Article 52 of the
Vienna Convention). Since it is axiomatic that no "agreement" can exist without the consent of
all parties, if a State has a legal obligation to conclude an unspecified agreement it is presumably
at the mercy of the other party or parties.
92. Article X of the NPT provides, inter alia: "Each Party shall in exercising its national
sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events,
related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests ofits country.
It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United
Nations Security Council three months in advance...."
93. Tacna-Arica Question (Chile v. Peru), 2 R.I.A.A. 921, 926 (1925). For a useful
discussion of this and other international cases of relevance, see Martin A. Rogoff, The Obligation
to Negotiate in International Law, 16 MICH.). INTL L. 141 (1994).
94. 2 R.I.A.A. 929-930.
95. Railway Traffic Between Lithuania and Poland, Oct. 15, 1931, PCI) (ser. NB), No.4 2,
at 108.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
98. International Status of South-West Africa, 1950I.C.]. 128.
99. Id. at 184 (dissenting opinion ofjudge Alvarez) (emphasis added).
100. Graeco-German Arbitration, 19 R.I.A.A. 55 (1990); 47 INTERNATIONAL LAW
REpORTS 452-53 (E. Lauterpacht, ed. 1974).
101. 47 INTL L. REP'T at 453.
102. Quoted in Ulrich Beyerlin, Pactum de Contrahendo, Pactum de Negotiando, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 854,858 (1997).
103. I.C.). STAT. art. 38(3).
104. LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 27,29 (1986). See also, MAX S0RENSEN,
MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 678-679 {1968} (emphasis added).
105. 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 328 (1990).
106. Id. at 330.
107. Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 90, art. 32.
108. 2 MOHAMED I. SHAKER, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND
IMPLEMENTATION 1959-1979, at566 {1980}.
109. Id. at 569-570.
110. Id. at 570.
111. Id. at 571 {emphasis added}.
112. Id. at 567 {italicized emphasis added} {quoting U.S. negotiator Gerard Smith.} Dr.
Shaker notes further that "[s]ome countries took refuge in the UN General Assembly resolution
2373(XXII} commending the final draft of the NPT, [and] interpreting it as laying upon the
nuclear-weapon States a solemn obligation to agree on further constructive measures of
disarmament over and above the provisions of Article VI of the NPT." Id. at 572. One might
note that: {I} this is a much narrower "obligation" than that held by the World Court to exist in
the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion; {2} the United States, for its part, has in fact agreed to a
wide range of "further constructive measures of disarmament" through the SALT and START
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process and through various multilateral treaties; and (3) resolutions of the UN General
Assembly are not binding as a source of treaty interpretation.
113. See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons, "Statement of the Government of the United Kingdom,]une
1995," at 53.
114. I.C.]. STAT. art. 68 (emphasis added).
115. Id., art. 53.
116. Id., art. 49.
117. Id., art. 50.
118. "The Court would observe that none of the States advocating the legality of the use of
nuclear weapons under certain circumstances ... has indicated what ... would be the precise
circumstances justifying such use...." Nuclear Weapons, para. 94.
119. Nuclear Weapons (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins at para. 9). For similar
observations made more than a dozen years earlier, see \'i/. Michael Reisman, Deterrence and
IntemationalLaw, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE LAw, supra note 27, at 129,131-132; and
John Norton Moore, Nuclear Weapons and the Law: Enhancing Strategic Stability, in id. at 51,
54-55.
120. See, e.g., OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, WORLDWIDE SUBMARINE CHALLENGES
16 (1997).
121. I have chosen to use this older missile because its characteristics are better known than
the newer SS-NX- 28 that is reportedly being built for the new Borey-class submarines. While the
Borey is expected to carry "at least 12 strategic missiles," their characteristics and payload are not
in the public domain. Id.
122. Robert F. Turner, Killing Saddam: Would It Be a Crime? WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1990 at

Dl.
123. It has been widely reported that Saddam has constructed a number of hardened
underground sites to protect him from personal risk. The world community has now affirmed
that aggressive war is a criminal act erga omnes, and even if one assumed that a deep-penetrating
small nuclear warhead would in some settings cause collateral damage claiming hundreds and
perhaps thousands of innocent lives, this may be more acceptable than a prolonged conventional
conflict in which hundreds of thousands or even millions of soldiers and noncombatants are
slaughtered. Further, when the regime elite in question has the capability of unleashing weapons
of mass destruction on innocent civilians in other countries, these risks must be balanced against
anticipated collateral damage from a surgical strike against the aggressor regime elite. Each
setting must obviously be evaluated in the context of all of the available information; but the idea
that international law prohibits even threatening to use such a weapon to destroy the leadership
of an aggressor State in an effort to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction against millions
ofinnocent civilians is without foundation (see infra, notes 197-198 and accompanying text). To
be sure, the risks of collateral damage must always be considered and might often preclude the
actual use of such a weapon; but there is no per se ban on the threat of such use as an element of
deterrence of international aggression.
124. The terrorists in this setting made no threat to occupy the United States or change even
its form of government-and the Cambodian tragedy of two decades ago has demonstrated that
a country might lose nearly a third of its population to tyranny and still "survive" as a State.
125. There is no stare decisis rule for the \'i/orld Court. Even in contentious cases, "[t]he
decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case." I.C.J. STAT. art. 59.
126. UN CHARTER art. 92.
127. Id., pmbl.
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128. ELLIOTT L. MEYROWITZ, PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE RELEVANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 208 (1990).
129. rd. at 204.
130. rd. at 206.
131. rd. at 202.
132. JOHN ELLIS, WORLD WAR II: A STATISTICAL SURVEY 253 (1993).
133. R.J. RUMMEL, THE MIRACLE THAT IS FREEDOM 3 (1995).
134. See, e.g., BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1993); R.J. RUMMEL,
POWER KILLS: DEMOCRACY AS A METHOD OF NONVIOLENCE (1997) and other works by this
author; and Part IV of APPROACHES TO PEACE: AN INTELLECTUAL MAP 0.Y!. Scott Thompson
et al. eds., 1991}.
135. Particularly insightful on these issues is the work of my colleague, Professor John
Norton Moore, who co-teaches a seminar with me at the University of Virginia School of Law on
"War and Peace." While much of his work is still unwritten, a useful summary of some of his
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